

CONSCIENCE AND THE ADOLESCENT:  
A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS APPROACH

by  
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June 5, 1965

F. Thomas Trotter

WAS DU ERERBT VON DEINEN VATERN HAST,

ERWIRB ES, UM ES ZU BESITZEN.

"What thou hast inherited from thy fathers, acquire  
it to make it thine."<sup>1</sup>

Goethe, Faust, Part I, Scene 1.

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<sup>1</sup>Quoted by Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of  
the Complete Psychological Works (London: Hogarth Press,  
1953-64), XIII, 158; XXIII, 207.

To my wife, Elizabeth  
and our friend David Morgan.



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## INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this study to present and appraise the postulate that the superego undergoes modification during adolescence. The construct superego is used both as a function and as an organization or system. The function of the superego is described by Freud in the first chapter as being generally the critical and prohibiting aspect of the personality. The system contains not only this early critical superego but also the ego ideal and the moral conscience. In adolescence it is the ego ideal and conscience that primarily undergo restructuring.

The critical superego, moralistic and negative, was the aspect primarily investigated by Freud with characteristic persistence. In spite of this persistence over a period of many years he did not present a coherent theory of the superego. Nor did he carry his investigations into the period of adolescence or its later ego ideal and conscience as they impinge upon and as they are changed by the adolescent struggle for adult roles and ideals. This task remained for those who followed him. These investigators not only include psychoanalysts as Edith Jacobson and Erik Erikson but also developmental psychologists as Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget. Inhelder and Piaget

explored the new cognitive capacities arising in adolescence. With new cognition and new identifications the ego ideal undergoes modification and consolidation. With new formal thought capacities the adolescent is able to grasp for the first time historical perspective and ideology. He learns to grasp the flux of time, to anticipate the future in a coherent way, to perceive and assent to ideals: to take, in short, an ideological position.

The personal struggles involved in the search for inner coherence and a positive conscience is found in the historical case study of young Luther. His ideological, ethical and religious propensities directed him toward a consolidation of a positive conscience. He sought a way through the critical negative superego to an autonomous conscience that becomes integrated, both flexible and strong.

The organization of this study consists in the presentation in three chapters the three functions of superego development and restructuring during adolescence. Chapter One deals with Freud. In his writings we see an analysis of the critical superego, its genesis and moralistic outlook. In Chapter Two the ego ideal is dealt with as it is modified in adolescence through the arising of the capacity for cognitive formal thought and the influence

of ideology, new identifications and psycho-social reality. In Chapter Three the maturation of the superego into an autonomous moral conscience is reflected in the psychological and religious case study of young Luther. The positive conscience essentially contributes to his inner coherence, freedom and ethical perspective. The progression of the development (critical superego, epigenetic ego ideal and positive conscience) is ideally a phase specific developmental task of adolescence.

**CHAPTER ONE:**  
**FREUD AND THE SUPEREGO**

Freud's theory of the superego does not in fact exist. His concept of the superego is reflected in his writings over a period of forty years. The plan of Chapter One is to contribute clarification through a chronological examination of what Freud himself had to say about the superego, its genesis, function and structure. All references in Chapter One are from The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Not only does his understanding of the superego expand through the years, but it changes and is contradictory from essay to essay. The terms ego ideal, conscience and superego are at times used synonymously and at other times used to demarcate separate aspects of the personality. These confusions in his writings reflect his gropings and lack of clear perspective on the problem.

#### CONSCIENCE AND EGO IDEAL: 1895-1923

In the earliest writings of Freud, morality and its effects on mental life occupy a key position. The connection between morality and repression is, in fact, central to the thesis of the "Studies in Hysteria" (1895). While the theory of morality and repression is not in itself a theory of conscience, it does provide many of the observations (deductions) upon which his later theory of conscience is based. The theory was developed during his

acquaintance and work with Joseph Breuer, who at the time of Freud's graduation from medical school was engaged in attempting to cure a twenty-one year old girl who was suffering from hysteria.<sup>1</sup> In 1892 Freud began his first full-length analysis<sup>2</sup> of hysteria.<sup>3</sup> The symptoms of illness were interpreted by Freud in terms of "erotic ideas" coming into conflict with "moral conceptions," thus producing a "splitting-off of the consciousness." Under the guise of "resistance and defense" a "process of censorship"<sup>4</sup> is mentioned in this case that is to find many applications and fructify in later works.

In the first series of lectures on psychoanalysis at Clark University, Worcester, Massachusetts (1909), Freud summarizes the work on hysteria stating that "the subject's ethical and other standards"<sup>5</sup> were the repressing forces, repression having taken place due to the "incompatibility of the wish in question (sexual) with "ego" of the patient. The process is revealed as "one of the devices serving to protect the mental personality." The important point with

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<sup>1</sup>Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-64), II, 21-47. (All footnotes in Chapter One refer only to The Standard Edition.)

<sup>2</sup>II, xii.      <sup>3</sup>II, 135-181.      <sup>4</sup>II, 269.

<sup>5</sup>XI, 24.



respect to the subjects ethical and aesthetic ideals is not their existence, for Freud always presumes their existence. The important question is whether the relationship between moral pretensions and undesirable urges is authentic or inauthentic. These considerations lead us to conclude that Freud's earliest formulation of personality theory stresses the primary importance of phenomena that were later taken into his theory of superego and of conscience. That this process continues from early in life is clear:

Even before puberty extremely energetic repressions of certain instincts have been effected under the influence of education, and mental forces such as shame, disgust and morality have been set up, which, like watchmen, maintain these repressions. So that when at puberty the high tide of sexual demands is reached, it is met by these mental reactive or resistant structures like dams, which direct its flow into what are called normal channels and make it impossible for it to re-activate the instincts that have undergone repression.<sup>6</sup>

From the beginning of Freud's thinking, then and in contrast to his instinctivist position on other matters, learning ("education") and "developing forces" are seen to play an important psychic role, especially in the adolescent period. This position is elaborated in 1911 with Freud's statement that education is a strong force in the replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle.<sup>7</sup> Education "makes use of an offer of love as a

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<sup>6</sup>XI, 45.

<sup>7</sup>XII, 224.

reward from the educators," and "fails if a spoilt child thinks that it possesses that love in any case and cannot lose it whatever happens."<sup>8</sup> Here is an early statement of the "loss of love" punishment technique that is a focus of attention in child and adolescent psychology today.

### THE OEDIPUS COMPLEX

"The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900) presents the first discussion of the Oedipus complex. The process of resolution of the complex is not spelled out, although Freud claims that non-neurotics "have since . . . childhood succeeded in withdrawing (their) sexual impulses from (their) mothers, and in forgetting (their) jealousy of (their) fathers."<sup>9</sup> Again, the connection between morality, erotic wishes and repression is reiterated, this time finding expression in several references to a "dream censorship" that "practices dream distortion . . . in order to prevent the development of anxiety or other forms of affect."<sup>10</sup>

In "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" (1905) Freud continues his presentation of the oedipal struggle in the male and female four year olds who are developing object-

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid.    <sup>9</sup>XI, 224.    <sup>10</sup>IV, 262.

directed impulses. Consequently, the boy becomes sexually interested in the mother and the girl becomes sexually interested in her father. The physical difference in biological size and capacity coupled with the social factor in the presence of the parent of the opposite sex make even minor experimental attempts to gratify object-directed genital impulses very difficult, if not completely impossible. When one or both parents enforce the social restrictions upon incest,<sup>11</sup> the consequence is a traumatic situation which drives the psyche to a very forceful repression. Freud was of the opinion that the repression of the object-directed genital impulses was of the highest significance for the development of subsequent moral and ethical pretensions. According to this developmental formulation, conscience is the "heir to the Oedipal complex." By repressing libidinal urges, the immature psyche is able to take parental ethical and aesthetic restrictions into its conscious ego.<sup>12</sup>

The repression and sublimation of object-directed libidinal energy initiates a stage in the development of the child which Freud designated as latency. During latency, there is a continual reinforcement of the "watchmen" of shame,

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<sup>11</sup>IV, 141 ff.

<sup>12</sup>VII, 225.

disgust and morality, which have been initiated during earlier traumata. It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral ideals.<sup>13</sup> Freud goes on to state the following:

This development is organically determined and fixed by heredity, and it can occasionally occur without any help at all from education.<sup>14</sup>

However, Freud does not thereby mean that social influences have no bearing at all upon sexual development. Education is here used in the traditional sense of admonition and instruction. The mere basic social factors are to be subsumed under what he later calls "accidental factors," in a note which he added to the above article in 1915:

It is not easy to estimate the relative efficacy of the constitutional and accidental factors. In theory one is always inclined to overestimate the former; therapeutic practice emphasizes the importance of the latter. It should, however, on no account be forgotten that the relation between the two is a cooperative and not a mutually exclusive one.<sup>15</sup>

The repression of object-directed libido, which is characteristic of latency, is overturned by the resurgence of the sexual impulses that accompany the physical maturation of adolescence. The onset of adolescence reopens the Oedipal trauma.

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<sup>13</sup>VII, 176-179.    <sup>14</sup>VII, 177-178.    <sup>15</sup>VII, 177.

In Freud's 1905 writings, he also presents what is later to become a primary factor in the resolution of the Oedipus. Freud mentions the aim of the oral-cannibalistic period in the child, as the "incorporation of the object--the prototype of the process which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important psychological part."<sup>16</sup> That important part is left unclear at this time by Freud.

A short essay of 1909 does suggest however, that being like one's parents (identification) is an early "wish" of the child.

For a small child his parents are at first the only authority and the source of all belief. This child's most intense and most momentous wish during these early years is to be like his parents (that is, the parent of his own sex) and to be big like his father and mother.<sup>17</sup>

### "TOTEM AND TABOO"

With the publication of the four essays entitled "Totem and Taboo" (1913), the term "conscience" is introduced for the first time in Freud's writings. A comparison of the compulsive prohibitions of "obsessional neurosis" and taboos yields fruitful insight. Freud notes the "unmotivated and enigmatic" origin of both the "prohibitions" and "taboos." In both cases, "no external threat of

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<sup>16</sup>VII, 239.

<sup>17</sup>VII, 198.

punishment" is required, for there is an internal certainty (conscience) a moral conviction, that any violation will lead to intolerable disaster.<sup>18</sup>

. . . the explanation of taboo also throws light on the nature and origin of conscience, it is possible, without any stretching of the sense of the terms, to speak of a taboo conscience or, after a taboo has been violated, of a taboo sense of guilt. Taboo conscience is probably the earliest form in which the phenomenon of conscience is met with.

Conscience is the internal perception of the rejection of a particular wish operating within us. The stress, however, is upon the fact that this rejection has no need to appeal to anything else for support, that it is quite "certain of itself."<sup>19</sup>

Further following the model of compulsive prohibition, Freud decides that taboos are ancient prohibitions (against strong desires) that were forced upon a generation of primitive people by an earlier generation and maintained through tradition set up by social and parental authority. Possibly, however, in later generations they may have become "organized" as an inherited psychical endowment.<sup>20</sup> In primal society, however, conscience originated "on a basis of emotional ambivalence, from quite specific human relations to which this ambivalence was attached."<sup>21</sup> Society is depicted in its primal state as consisting of a violent and jealous father who drives away his growing sons

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<sup>18</sup>IX, 237.    <sup>19</sup>XIII, 26-27.    <sup>20</sup>XIII, 67-68.

<sup>21</sup>XIII, 31.

and keeps the females for himself. "One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde."<sup>22</sup> The sons manifest ambivalence in their feelings toward the father, hating him because he stood in the way of their sexual demands, yet loving and admiring him. Freud states explicitly that "the ambivalent emotional attitude is present in the father complex in our children and which often persists into adult life."<sup>23</sup>

The father is thus a "feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers." The hatred of the sons is satisfied by their patricide, their envy resolved through identification with the father by means of oral incorporation. The sons' suppressed love for the father asserts itself in a strong sense of guilt. "The dead father became stronger than the living one had been--for events took the course we so often see them follow in human affairs to this day."<sup>24</sup> Thus, out of this sense of guilt, the adolescent sons undo their deed by creating the two fundamental taboos of totemism: the totem (or father substitutes) must not be killed and a woman belonging to the same totem is not to be used for sexual purposes. These two

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<sup>22</sup>XIII, 21.    <sup>23</sup>XIII, 141.    <sup>24</sup>Ibid.

prohibitions agree in content, as Freud is quick to point out, with the crimes of Oedipus and "as well as with the two primal wishes of children, the insufficient repression or the re-awakening of which forms the nucleus of perhaps every psychoneurosis."<sup>25</sup>

In regard to these generally sweeping statements, it might be well to point out that Freud himself raises the question of the transmission of the sense of guilt and of these primal wishes through the generations to the present. In a remarkably "modern" statement of the Heredity-Environment issue, Freud states that "a part of the problem seems to be met by the inheritance of a psychical disposition which, however, need to be given some sort of impetus in the life of the individual before they can be roused into actual operation."<sup>26</sup> Although psychic transmission in Freud's sense is by no means established, nor is the relative contribution of education and innate ideas, his statement of the relationship between heredity and environment factors stands as the essence of "modern" inter-actionist points of view. We shall meet this same issue again in the context of phylogenetic versus ontogenetic explanations in Freud's subsequent writings. In any case, it is clear that

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<sup>25</sup>XIII, 143.

<sup>26</sup>XIII, 132.



the nuclear ideas in the development of conscience are already present. Incorporation, the Oedipus complex, ambivalence and the father as "model" are the essential ingredients for further development and modification. We must now follow this "working through."

### "ON NARCISSISM"

With his essay, "On Narcissism" (1914) Freud moved back to the clinic, away from the phylogenetic emphasis to the ontogenetic. Here, Freud introduces a new construct, the ego ideal, demonstrating that his attention had moved to the ego, and away from the exclusive investigation of the unconscious. Furthermore, the ego ideal brings the "personal and moral and aesthetic pretensions" of his earlier thinking into a mere systematic, if abbreviated, framework.

The normal primary state of the child is seen by Freud as a megalomaniac one of narcissism. Freud postulated that the infant originally takes its own body to be the object of libidinal satisfaction, a condition which he called "primary narcissism." The development of the ego consists in a departure from this perfect state. The child comes to make object-choices with his parents.

The man is reluctant and incapable of foregoing his original narcissistic existence completely; the remainder of the

narcissistic libido, that not replaced by anaclitic libido, becomes attached to the ego ideal which is mediated by the culture. Man's self-esteem becomes bound together with the cultural ideal which he recognizes as standards that lay claim upon him.

The ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the actual ego. The subject's narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which like the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value . . . What he (the subject) projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood.<sup>27</sup>

Thus the ego ideal now is the recipient of the self-love enjoyed by the real ego in childhood. The ego ideal "measures the actual ego" and its formation is a condition of repression. When the actual ego attains the requirements of the ego ideal (often through repression), gratification (self-love) is derived. However, this leads to complications in the gratification of libido through objects, since, "it causes some of them to be rejected by means of its censor, as being incompatible."<sup>28</sup> Freud explicitly ties the ego ideal to "cultural and ethical ideas," stating that the ego ideal means more than intellectual knowledge of these ideas. The individual must recognize them as "a standard for himself and submits to the claims they make

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<sup>27</sup>XIII, 158.

<sup>28</sup>XIV, 94.

on him."<sup>29</sup>

At this point, Freud drew upon his observations of paranoia to introduce a new dimension.

It would not surprise us if we were to find a special institution in the mind which performs the task of seeing that narcissistic gratification is secured from the ego-ideal and that, with this end in view, it constantly watches the real ego and measures it by that ideal. If such an institution does exist, it cannot possibly be something which we have not yet discovered; we need only recognize it, and we may say that what we call our conscience has the required characteristics.<sup>30</sup>

The conscience here becomes the ego-function that watches and measures the ego according to the ego ideal and that withholds primary narcissism from the ego when it fails to meet its own standards. "The lament of the paranoiac shows that at bottom the self criticism of conscience is identical with, and based upon, self-observation."<sup>31</sup>

Developmentally, the conscience is awakened by the influence of parental criticism, and later by the criticism of those who stand as parental substitutes.<sup>32</sup> In the course of illness, the development of conscience is turned in a reverse direction.

The voices, as well as the undefined multitude, are brought into the foreground again by the disease, and so the evolution of conscience is reproduced

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<sup>29</sup>XIV, 100.      <sup>30</sup>XIV, 93.      <sup>31</sup>XIV, 94.

<sup>32</sup>XIV, 96.

regressively. But the revolt against this "censoring agency" arises out of the subject's desire . . . to liberate himself from all these influences, beginning with the parental one, and out of his withdrawal of homosexual libido from them. His conscience then confronts him in a regressive form as a hostile influence from without.<sup>33</sup>

This special "censoring agency" is seen as the embodiment of parental criticism and subsequently of society. Freud finds ample confirmation for the existence of conscience in the delusions of being watched, "that is so characteristic of paranoia." Freud concluded that the sensation of being observed occurs in a variety of instances broad enough to recommend the assumption that self-observation is a part of normal mental development.

"The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido on to an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling this ideal."<sup>34</sup> Conscience here becomes an inner call to recover the early narcissistic satisfaction of infancy.

[The adult ego] is not willing to forego the narcissistic perfection of his childhood; and when, as he grows up, he is disturbed by the admonitions of others and by the wakening of his own critical judgment, so that he

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

can no longer retain that perfection he seeks to recover it in the new form of an ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal.<sup>35</sup>

Phenomenologically, the most immediate conscious experience connected with conscience is that of guilt. Freud linked the guilt of conscience with the guilt evidenced in paranoia by theorizing that the guilt of paranoia is related to the disposition of homosexual libido and by extending the latter idea to the conception of conscience.

[The ego-ideal] binds not only a person's narcissistic libido, which is in this way turned back into the ego. The want of satisfaction which arises from the non-fulfillment of this ideal liberates homosexual libido, and this is transformed into a sense of guilt (social anxiety). Originally, this sense of guilt was a fear of punishment by the parents, or more correctly, a fear of losing their love.<sup>36</sup>

This statement indicates a distinction between narcissistic libido and homosexual libido and then proceeds to theorize that release of the former results in self esteem, while release of the latter results in a sense of guilt. It is the function of conscience to "keep guard" over the ego ideal and to enforce the ego ideal; and the greater the "distance" between the ego ideal and the reality-ego, the greater will be the sense of guilt.

It is precisely in neurotics that we find the highest differences of potential between the development of

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<sup>35</sup>XIV, 100.

<sup>36</sup>XIV, 94.

their ego ideal and the amount of sublimation of their primitive libidinal instincts; and in general it is far harder to convince an idealist of the inexpedient location of his libido than a plain man whose pretensions have remained more moderate.<sup>37</sup>

## TWO PAPERS

Two papers were published by Freud in 1915-16 that, although not directly related, prepare the foundation for later theoretical improvements.

In "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (1915) Freud reiterates again the importance of ambivalence in the period of oral incorporation, "A type of love which is consistent with abolishing the object's separate existence and which may therefore be described as ambivalent."<sup>38</sup> The condition of such incorporation or "devouring" is that the objects be sources of pleasure. Pleasurable objects are "introjected."<sup>39</sup>

In "Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work" (1916) Freud ties the sense of guilt and the strength of conscience to those character-types "wrecked by success" and those who are criminals "from a sense of guilt." In the case of those "wrecked by success" (those who become ill because of an overwhelmingly powerful wish of theirs

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<sup>37</sup>XIV, 101-102.    <sup>38</sup>XIV, 95.    <sup>39</sup>XIV, 138.

is finally fulfilled), Freud states that the "forces of conscience which forbid the subject to gain the long hoped-for advantage from the fortunate change in reality."<sup>40</sup> He goes on to state that it is a difficult task to discover the "essence and origin of these judging and punishing trends."<sup>41</sup> However, Freud concludes this section using Shakespeare's Lady Macbeth as a clinical example, following his line of thought in "Totem and Taboo":

Psycho-analytic work teaches that the forces of conscience which induce illness in consequence of success, instead of, as normally, in consequence of frustration, are closely connected with the Oedipus Complex, the relation to father and mother--as perhaps, indeed, is our sense of guilt in general.<sup>42</sup>

In turning to "criminals from a sense of guilt," he states several important claims in three pages of essay:

1. Some delinquent or criminal deeds are done because they are forbidden and because their execution was accompanied by mental relief for their doer.<sup>43</sup>
2. The origin of the oppressive feeling of guilt is unknown to the doer.
3. The sense of "mental relief" comes as a result of punishment for the misdeed.
4. This obscure sense of guilt derives from the Oedipus complex and is a reaction to the wishes of incest and patricide.

Although the fourth point appears to be a reconfirmation of the ontogenetic point of view presented in "Those

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<sup>40</sup>XIV, 136: The term is Ferenczi's, 1909, and it is the first occasion on which Freud himself used it.

<sup>41</sup>XIV, 318.      <sup>42</sup>Ibid.      <sup>43</sup>XIV, 331.

wrecked by success," Freud states here that

. . . other investigations have brought us to the hypothesis that the consequence of mankind, which now appears as an inherited mental force, was acquired in connection with the Oedipus complex.<sup>44</sup>

From this statement we are left with the question as to whether the individual's guilt or conscience is inherited from the primal horde (e.g., as a kind of "original sin") or whether it arises from his resolution of the Oedipus complex in his own family situation. At this stage Freud's thinking, we must conclude that the phylogenetic and ontogenetic are not clearly separated. At the least, the relative contribution of heredity (whether psychic or not) and environment are not spelled out.

#### WRITINGS OF 1917

In "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), Freud reiterates and refines earlier constructs in explaining the self-reproach and loss of self-esteem found in melancholia. His argument is included in the following:

1. Object choice-libido attaches itself to a certain person; there is a strong fixation to the love object.
2. Injury or disappointment "undermines" the relationship.
3. The object-cathexis has little resistance, and it is abandoned.

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<sup>44</sup>XIV, 332.



4. Free libido is withdrawn into ego and not directed to another object.

5. The libido "was not employed in an unspecified way, but served to establish an identification of the ego with the abandoned object.<sup>45</sup> This is "oral incorporation," a "narcissistic identification."

The peculiarly distinct characteristic of pathological melancholia is the loss of self-esteem, which loss sets melancholia apart from other forms of mourning.<sup>46</sup> The loss of self-esteem is related to the capacity of the ego to set itself over against itself.

We see how (in the case of melancholia) one part of the ego sets itself over against the other, judges it critically, and, as it were, takes it as its object. Our suspicion that the critical agency which is here split off from the ego might also show its independence in other circumstances will be confirmed by every further observation. We shall really find grounds for distinguishing this agency from the rest of the ego. What we are here becoming acquainted with is the agency commonly called "conscience"; we shall count it, along with the censorship of consciousness and reality-testing, among the major institutions of the ego, and we shall come upon evidence to show that it can become diseased on its own account.<sup>47</sup>

As previously indicated in the case of paranoia, here again there is a split in the conscious ego and the experience of guilt tied to the "critical agency."

The roots of such radical self-reproach and the cause of the loss of self-esteem is the loss of the "love object." Unlike mourning, melancholia is unique in that it involves

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<sup>45</sup>XIV, 333.    <sup>46</sup>XIV, 249.    <sup>47</sup>XIV, 244.

an unconscious loss of love-object.<sup>48</sup> The melancholic's attack upon the ego does not fit the ego as it is. Freud concludes that the ego is in conflict with the lost object that has been incorporated within itself.

Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.<sup>49</sup>

Developmentally, the basis for the criticism of one segment of the ego by another is the process of identification. Identification involves ambivalence, a fact that explains the ambivalence underlying melancholia. "If the love for the object--a love which cannot be given up though the object itself is given up--takes refuge in narcissistic identification, then the hate comes into operation on this substitutive object, abusing it, debasing it, making it suffer and deriving sadistic satisfaction from its suffering."<sup>50</sup> The melancholic manifests his ambivalence toward the lost object by idolizing his love for the object, and at the same time depreciating in himself the unconscious substitute for the lost object. And as indicated in point five, Freud suggested that the identification that

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<sup>48</sup>XIV, 247.      <sup>49</sup>XIV, 245.      <sup>50</sup>XIV, 249.

is basic to melancholia may begin with the oral incorporation that is characteristic of the oral phase.<sup>51</sup> Indeed one unique contribution of this paper is in the raising the whole question of the nature of identification. Here Freud speaks of identification as "a preliminary stage of object-choice . . . the first way in which the ego picks out an object" and adds that "the ego wants to incorporate this object into itself, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libidinal development at which it is, it wants to do so by devouring it."<sup>52</sup> Identification thereby becomes central to the establishment of conscience.

The other contribution by Freud in the year 1917 was in the form of "Introductory Lectures," in which he summarizes briefly the work on delusions of observation, narcissistic object and the agency which "unceasingly observes, criticizes and compares, and in that way sets itself over against the other part of the ego."<sup>53</sup> The ego ideal is introduced again as a separate concept, the conscience measuring it against the actual attainments of the ego. Rather than existing as a separate institution within the ego (as in "Mourning and Melancholia"), the censorship function of the ego is once again attributed to the

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<sup>51</sup>XIV, 251.    <sup>52</sup>XIV, 249-50.    <sup>53</sup>Ibid.

conscience.

For the first time, Freud states that the conscience, that "self-observing agency . . . reveals to us its origin from the influence of parents, educators and social environment--from an identification with some of these model figures."<sup>54</sup> Again identification is presented as central to the process and establishment of conscience.

#### RELATED WRITINGS OF 1919

In two lesser known works in 1919, Freud shed further light on the genesis of conscience, giving more cryptic hints as to the direction of his later thinking. "A Child is Being Beaten" takes up the problem of the origin of guilt involved in the transformation of sadism into masochism. Freud comments that the analyses

. . . do not tell us the origin of the sense of guilt itself. It seems to be brought along by the new phase upon which the child is entering, and if it afterwards persists, it seems to correspond to a scar-like formation which is similar to the sense of inferiority. According to our present orientation in the structure of the ego, which is as yet uncertain, we should assign it to the agency in the mind which sets itself up as a critical conscience over against the rest of the ego.<sup>55</sup>

Thus conscience, guilt and the Oedipal complex join company once more, but in their uncertain relationship no mention

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<sup>54</sup>XVI, 428.

<sup>55</sup>XVI, 429.

is made of identification.

In Preface to Reik's Ritual: Psychoanalytic Studies, Freud offers another hint as to the development of conscience, if (following "On Narcissism") we are to regard the latter as equivalent with "cultural development." Freud states in the preface that the Oedipal complex:

. . . does not owe its importance to any unintelligible conjunction; the emphasis laid upon the relation of children to their parents is an expression of the biological facts that the young of the human race pass through a long period of dependence and are slow in reaching maturity, as well as their capacity for love undergoes a complicated course of development. Consequently, the overcoming of the Oedipus complex coincides with the most efficient way of mastering the archaic, animal heritage of humanity. It is true that heritage comprises all the forces that are required for the subsequent cultural development of the individual, but they must first be sorted out and worked over. This archaic heirloom is not fit to be used for the purposes of civilized social life in the form in which it is inherited by the individual.<sup>56</sup>

This may be construed as a partial solution of the phylogenetic-ontogenetic problem in that what is inherited must be "worked over" in the child's own Oedipal phase. The explanation may be criticized, of course, on the grounds of its shifting the burden of explanation to the process of "sorting out and working through" without sufficient elaboration. A further reference to conscience that same year of 1919 is located in the essay, "The Uncanny," where Freud

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<sup>56</sup>XVII, 194.

writes of a "special agency . . . slowly formed there, which is able to stand over against the rest of the ego, which has the function of observing and criticizing the self and of exercising a censorship within the mind."<sup>57</sup> Whether this "slowness" may be attributed to the "sorting out and working through" process is speculative. We may decide with certainty, at any rate, that conscience is not inherited as a fully-formed "piece of psychic-property" as is suggested in "Totem and Taboo."

"GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND ANALYSIS OF THE EGO"

In this work (1921) Freud states succinctly, "it has long been our contention that 'dread of society' is the essence of what is called conscience."<sup>58</sup> By this Freud indicates that social anxiety or "dread of society" is a part of the constitution of every person, a result of the fact that every individual adult must pass through the Oedipal situation. Then "fear of society" becomes a symptom of repression common to all men, and is a generalized form of a fear of the father.

In "Group Psychology" Freud did not make clear just how repression is released as a result of being a member of a

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<sup>57</sup>XVII, 261-62.

<sup>58</sup>XVII, 235.

group, though several hypotheses were advanced. Freud stressed that membership in a group may result in an increase in morality, rather than a decrease. "Le Bon himself was prepared to admit that in certain circumstances the morals of a group can be higher than those of the individuals who compose it, and that only collectives are capable to a high degree of unselfishness and devotion."<sup>59</sup> Unlike Le Bon's analysis of the primitive group, Freud was interested also in explaining group phenomena characterized by abnormally high morality, e.g., the church and the army. Freud states that "the essence of a group lies in the libidinal ties existing in it."<sup>60</sup> He supports this argument with the observation that in the cases of both the Roman Catholic Church and the army there is the illusion of a single "Commander-in-Chief" who loves every individual in the group with an equal love. "Everything depends upon this illusion; if it were to be dropped, then both church and army would dissolve, so far as the external force permitted them to."<sup>61</sup> Each individual is equally joined to the "commander" and thereby equally joined to every other individual.

In Freud's next essay he made the analogy between the

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<sup>59</sup>XVIII, 74.    <sup>60</sup>XVIII, 82.    <sup>61</sup>XVIII, 95-96.

group's idealization of its leader and the child's idealization of his father. This idealization is explained on the basis of early identification during infancy.

Identification is known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. It plays a part in the early history of the Oedipus complex. A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere. We may say simply that he takes his father as his ideal.<sup>62</sup>

Identification is to be distinguished from object choice. In the former, one's father (or the model) is what one would like to be; and in the latter, one's father (or the object) is what one would like to have. "Identification endeavours to mould a person's own ego after the fashion of the one that has been taken as a model."<sup>63</sup>

Besides identification with the father, there is an anaclitic attachment toward the mother. The two psychologically distinct ties "subsist side by side for a time without any mutual influence or interference. In consequence of the irresistible advance towards a unification of mental life, they come together at last; and the normal Oedipus complex originates from their confluence."<sup>64</sup>

The impossibility of achieving a consumation of anaclitic

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<sup>62</sup>XVIII, 94.    <sup>63</sup>XVIII, 105.    <sup>64</sup>XVIII, 106.



attachment forces the ego back to an earlier form of attachment, i.e., identification. The identification with the father offers an indirect anaclitic and vicarious attachment via the father's relationship with the mother. Furthermore identification is not restricted to the father.

It may arise with any new perception of a common quality shared with some other person who is not an object of the sexual instinct. The more important this common quality is, the more successful may this partial identification become, and it may thus represent the beginning of a new tie.<sup>65</sup>

The identification with an object (father) involves not only an empathic appropriation of the object's power, but also an inversion of the "hostile colouring" that was formerly felt toward the object. In the process of identification that "hostile colouring" is directed toward the ego itself, with the result that the ego often accuses itself with relentless and bitter self criticisms.

"Analyses have shown that this disparagement and these reproaches apply at bottom to the object and represent the ego's revenge upon it. The shadow of the object has fallen upon the ego."<sup>66</sup> Two pathological cases became the medium Freud uses to explore ambivalent identification in the Oedipal situation. He cites these two "negative" cases of adolescent homosexuality and melancholia to elaborate the

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<sup>65</sup>XVIII, 105.

<sup>66</sup>XVIII, 108.

factors involved in the resolution of the Oedipal complex. If the Oedipus is inverted, the father is taken as the object of a "feminine attitude." He becomes an object of gratification for directly sexual needs. Here identification has eventuated in object choice.<sup>67</sup>

A young man has been unusually long and intensely fixated upon his mother in the sense of the Oedipus complex. But at last, after the end of puberty, the time comes for exchanging his mother for some other sexual object. Things take a sudden turn: the young man does not abandon his mother, but identifies with her; he transforms himself into her, and now looks about for objects which can replace his ego for him, and on which he can bestow such love and care as he has experienced from his mother.<sup>68</sup>

"Identification with an object that is renounced" or lost as a substitute for that object through introjection of the object into the ego continues the earlier discussion on melancholia by Freud.<sup>69</sup> That analysis had pointed already to a split in the ego itself into two segments, one of which is the observer and criticizer while the other is

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<sup>67</sup>XVIII, 109.

<sup>68</sup>We may note here the long standing postulate of ambivalence which played such an important role in oral incorporation in "Totem and Taboo." Freud tells us again that identification is ambivalent from the very first, and "behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase of the organization of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such." XVIII, 105.

<sup>69</sup>XVIII, 108.

the observed and criticized.

But these melancholias also show us . . . the ego divided, fallen apart into two pieces, one of which rages against the second. This second piece is the one which has been altered by introjection and which contains the lost object. But the piece which behaves so cruelly is not unknown to us either. It comprises the conscience, a critical agency within the ego, which even in normal times takes up a critical attitude toward the ego, though never so relentlessly and so unjustifiably.<sup>70</sup>

This ego split results from the Oedipal conflict. The instinctual demands at odds with object reality, the destructive threat of the father with the erotic attachment toward the mother, results in a divided ego. Once divided, the personality continues its own self-criticism.

Such division intrapsychically sets up a state of stress that is internally experienced as guilt. The strength of conscience reflects the intensity of the inner stress between the two segments and functions of personality. The distance between the ego and the ego ideal varies from one individual to another. The limiting cases are seen as mania, on the one hand (where the ego ideal and the ego have fused) and "probably" melancholia on the other (where they are in sharp conflict). Just as there is a "feeling of triumph when something in the ego coincides with the ego ideal so the sense of guilt . . . can also be

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<sup>70</sup> XVIII, 109, cf. footnote 3.

understood as an expression of tension between the ego and the ego-ideal."<sup>71</sup>

The split between ego ideal and the ego forms the foundation for Freud's explanation of the idealization that accompanies the love relationship. Generally the ego ideal absorbs narcissistic libido. However in a love relationship, the loved object attracts the narcissistic libido that originally is directed to the ego itself.

It is even obvious in many forms of love-choice, that the object serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own. We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying narcissism.<sup>72</sup>

If carried to extremes, the love object "has been put in the place of the ego ideal."<sup>73</sup> The conscience then withdraws from any criticism of the loved object. The degree to which the loved object is exempt from criticism depends upon the degree to which that object has replaced the ego ideal. Whether an object has taken the place of the ego or whether it has taken the place of the ego ideal becomes the basis for distinction between identification and love-idealization. Identification is a matter where "the ego . . . has 'introjected' the object into itself," while love

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<sup>71</sup>XVIII, 109.    <sup>72</sup>XVIII, 131.    <sup>73</sup>XVIII, 112-13.

idealization is an incorporation into the ego ideal.<sup>74</sup>

With the discussion concerning the construct of the ego ideal, Freud contributes to a clarification of the problem of conscience. The conscience is related closely to the various functions of the ego ideal, which is the observer, criticizer, censor, and represser within the ego. The criticizing function in particular is experienced as conscience.

On previous occasions we have been driven to the hypothesis that some such agency develops in our ego which may cut itself off from the rest of the ego and come into conflict with it. We have called it the "ego ideal" and, by way of functions we have ascribed to it self-observation, the moral conscience, the censorship of dreams, and the chief influence in repression.<sup>75</sup>

The ego ideal functions as observer, moral conscience, censor, and represser; however certain processes may effect changes in the ego ideal. Freud briefly states that the ego ideal

. . . gradually gathers up from the influences of the environment the demands which that environment makes upon the ego and which the ego cannot always rise to; so that a man, when he cannot be satisfied with his ego itself, may nevertheless be able to find satisfaction in the ego ideal which has been differentiated out of the ego.<sup>76</sup>

This emphasis on gradualness may be parallel to the statement by Freud in "The Uncanny" where he mentions the

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<sup>74</sup>XVIII, 113.    <sup>75</sup>Ibid.    <sup>76</sup>XVIII, 110.

"slow formation" of the conscience.

The second change that may be effected in the ego ideal is not one of such gradual accumulation; it comes "in toto" and it is a radical modification. In Freud's simple formula, a loved object or group leader may replace the ego ideal. This is, in fact, his major thesis in explaining the psychology of the group.

A primary group of this kind (having a leader and not too much organization) is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego.<sup>77</sup>

Consequently when various individuals have introjected the same object into their ego ideals, they become emotionally bound together into a group. "Every Christian loves Christ as his ideal and feels himself united with all other Christians by the tie of identification."<sup>78</sup> Thus the Church becomes a group composed of individuals who have incorporated the same person, the same demands and the same restrictions into their ego ideals.<sup>79</sup>

In "Two Encyclopedia Articles, (A) Psycho-Analysis" written in 1922 Freud succinctly reviews psycho-analysis. In it he points to the Oedipus complex as a chief cornerstone, indicating the mother as the love object of the

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<sup>77</sup>Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>XVIII, 116.

<sup>79</sup>XVIII, 134.

child, and the hostility toward the father. Developmentally the next stage is latency during which, Freud claims, "ethical restraints are built up, to act as defenses against the desires of the Oedipus complex." In puberty, the Oedipus complex is "revivified in the unconscious and embarks upon further modifications."<sup>80</sup> In this same brief article, neurosis is defined by Freud as conflicts between the ego and those sexual impulses incompatible with its integrity or moral standards.

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<sup>80</sup>XVIII, 134-35.

## "THE EGO AND THE ID" (1923)

The most important single work written by Freud on the problem of conscience, the "agency" of the ego ideal, and the genesis of the superego is "The Ego and The Id." It is the last of Freud's major theoretical works of which the main thesis deals with his revision of the topography of the mind into a threefold division. Issues raised in earlier writings, especially "Group Psychology," are raised again for further discussion and elaboration. These ideas are discussed with more precision and insight, resulting in a major work of fresh syntheses.

The basis of Freud's previous theoretical work was the contrast between the conscious and the unconscious in the personality. But to account for the mechanism of repression or the "represser" on the basis of the conscious proved untenable. Resistance to the knowledge of defense mechanisms was found consistently in his clinical patients. Therefore Freud was increasingly forced to acknowledge that the represser in the personality must itself be at least partially unconscious. This being so, the line between the unconscious and pre-conscious could not be maintained. Besides if the represser extends into the unconscious, and if repression is an ego function, then it began to appear that the ego itself ought partly to be



described as unconscious. Thus the ego is important not only because of its consciousness or availability to consciousness. "We shall have to substitute for this antithesis another, taken from our insight into the structural conditions of the mind--the antithesis between the coherent ego and the repressed which is split off from it."<sup>81</sup> The new theoretical formulation shifts the major antithesis in the personality to that between the ego and the id, maintaining the belief that the ego is still a differentiated form of the id.<sup>82</sup> All the id is unconscious; only parts of both the ego and superego are. With these new formulations it was possible to indicate that the repressive mechanisms are unconscious. These mechanisms account for the fact that often "the faculties of self-criticism and conscience . . . are unconscious," and that "in a great number of neurosis an unconscious sense of guilt . . . plays a decisive economic part and puts the most powerful obstacles in the way of recovery."<sup>83</sup>

The superego, Freud's new term for the ego ideal,<sup>84</sup> is actually the "representative of the internal world, of the id."<sup>85</sup> In contrast, the ego is the representative of the

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<sup>81</sup>XVIII, 246.    <sup>82</sup>XIX, 17.    <sup>83</sup>XIX, 25.    <sup>84</sup>XIX, 26-27.

<sup>85</sup>"Ego Ideal." After "The Ego and The Id," the term ego ideal disappears almost completely as a technical term from Freud's writings.

external world. The superego contains within its structure the "archaic heritage" of man, the repressions of the history of the race. Furthermore this construct which is structurally in affinity with the unconscious id, contains the memory of the child's earliest object-relations, representing consequently the id to the ego. The result is that the superego is "less closely connected with consciousness" than the ego. Spatially the superego is "super" (above) because it dominates the ego, but also below because it is more closely connected with the unconscious id.

The development of the superego, according to Freud, follows generally his discussion in "Group Psychology" but with expansion and further clarification. The superego's development follows three stages: the pre-Oedipal, the Oedipal, and the post-Oedipal periods. The superego in the pre-Oedipal stage results from the infant's identification with the father, although "at the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral phase, object-cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other."<sup>86</sup> The genesis of the superego lies in this earliest of childhood identifications.

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<sup>86</sup>XIX, 36.

For behind (the ego ideal) there lies hidden an individual's first and most important identification, his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory.<sup>87</sup>

This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes place earlier than any object-cathesis.<sup>88</sup>

The second stage, that of the Oedipal conflict, contributes most to the development of the superego. In this phase the conflict occurs because of "an object-cathexis of his mother" that is an anaclitic object attachment to the mother while at the same time the boy deals with his father by identifying with him. These two emotional ties exist "side by side."<sup>89</sup> As maturation intensifies the sexual wishes toward the mother, the father is seen as an obstacle. The identification with him takes on a "hostile colouring and changes into a wish to get rid of his father in order to take his place with his mother."<sup>90</sup> This intense ambivalent attitude toward the father is overcome by giving up the mother as an object choice, an intensified identification with the father and a repression of the

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<sup>87</sup>XIX, 29.

<sup>88</sup>XIX, 27. In a footnote Freud adds at this point that perhaps it would be safer to say "with the parents" instead of the father alone in that the child is unable to distinguish at such an early age between mother and father.

<sup>89</sup>XIX, 31.

<sup>90</sup>XIX, 32.

hostile impulses.

The dissolution of the Oedipus conflict will consolidate "the masculinity in a boy's character," and permit "the affectionate relation to the mother to be in a measure retained."<sup>91</sup> Elaborating more fully, Freud continued by stating: "The more complete Oedipus complex which is two-fold, positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in the children."<sup>92</sup> The male child may be considered to form: both an ambivalent attitude and an affectionate feminine attitude towards the father and an object relation as well as hostility toward the mother. "At the dissolution of the Oedipus complex the four trends of which it consists will group themselves in such a way as to produce a father-identification and a mother identification. . . . The relative intensity of the two identifications in any individual will reflect the preponderance in him of one or other of the two sexual dispositions."<sup>93</sup> Freud suggests that bisexuality may account for the "ambivalence displayed in the relations to the parents" rather than "of identification in consequence of rivalry."<sup>94</sup>

In any case Freud summarizes unequivocally his thoughts

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid.    <sup>92</sup>Ibid.    <sup>93</sup>XIX, 33.

<sup>94</sup>XIX, 34.

regarding the development of the superego.

The broad general outcome of the sexual phase determined by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two identifications in some way united with each other. This modification of the ego retains its special position; it confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego ideal or superego.<sup>95</sup>

The post-Oedipal period in a continued series of object-choices, abandoned object-cathexis and identifications.

These identifications, both positive and negative, remain indelibly stamped in the boy's character.<sup>96</sup>

The superego is, however, not simply a residue of the earliest object-choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction-formation against these choices. This relation to the ego is not exhausted by the precept: "You ought to be like this (like your father)." It also comprises the prohibition: "You may not be like this (like your father)--that is, you may not do all that he does; some things are his prerogative." This double aspect of the ego ideal derives from the fact that the ego ideal has the task of repressing the Oedipus complex; indeed, it is to that revolutionary event that it owes its existence.<sup>97</sup>

Thus the child's parents, especially the father, are the source of the demands and prohibitions in the child's superego. While the superego retains the character of the father, in the post-Oedipal phase, it is progressively

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<sup>95</sup>XIX, 33.

<sup>96</sup>XIX, 34.

<sup>97</sup>XIX, 32. In a precisely analagous way, the outcome of the Oedipus attitude in a little girl may be an intensification of her identification with her mother (or the setting up of such identification for the first time)--a result which will fix the child's feminine character.

added to and modified by the identifications that occur.

As a child grows up, the role of father is carried on by teachers and others in authority; their injunctions and prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censorship. The tension between the demands of conscience and the actual performances of the ego is experienced as a sense of guilt. Social feelings rest on identifications with other people, on the basis of having the same ego ideal.<sup>98</sup>

While Freud does say that the superego remains amenable to every later influence, there is no expansion of this idea in this work.<sup>99</sup>

Freud continues to be preoccupied in "The Ego and The Id" with the development of the race (phylogenesis) and its relationship to the superego. The superego is a "derivation from the first object-cathexis of the id," that is from the Oedipus complex.

This derivation . . . brings it into relation with the phylogenetic acquisitions of the id and makes it an reincarnation of former ego-structures which have left their precipitates behind in the id. Thus the superego is always close to the id and can act as its representative vis-a-vis the ego. It reaches deep down into the id and for that reason is farther from consciousness than the ego is.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup>XIX, 34.

<sup>99</sup>XIX, 37.

<sup>100</sup>In discussing identifications that occur in the post-Oedipal phase of development Freud did not continue the problem of the development of the superego into adolescence although the above comments are particularly relevant to this period of life.

The phylogenetic acquisitions in the id represent "what biology and the vicissitudes of the human species have created in the id."<sup>101</sup> Through the forming of the ideal, these traces that are left behind in the id are "taken over by the ego and re-experienced in relation to itself as an individual."<sup>102</sup> Freud seems to be claiming that ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis and that the id is the essential mechanism to the recapitulation. And "owing to the way in which the ego ideal is formed, it has the most abundant links with the phylogenetic acquisition of each individual--his archaic heritage."<sup>103</sup> He elaborates by stating that "the ego ideal is . . . the heir of the Oedipus complex, and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important libidinal vicissitudes of the id."<sup>104</sup> We may conclude from his comments that the ontogenetically formed superego bears some affinity to the id and that the latter is the "agent" of phylogenetic transmission. While the problems of phylogenesis remain uncertain, Freud also has an explanation in terms of cultural transmissions:

. . . indeed by giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents it perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its origin.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>XIX, 48-49.

<sup>102</sup>XIX, 36.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid.

<sup>105</sup>Ibid.

The last chapter of Freud's writing on "The Ego and The Id" reviews his assumption that there exist two classes of instincts: Eros, which means sexuality, self-preservation, and love and Thanatos which means the Death Instinct and includes destruction, aggression, and hate. These are generally blended, i.e., found in a state of fusion. The possibility of a "difusion" of them forces Freud to re-examine how these instinct become important in the development and work of the superego. This process is complex. First, all the libido is accumulated in the id as in the beginning the ego is weak. As it grows in strength and demarcation the id "sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexis."<sup>106</sup> The ego, now stronger tries to "force itself on the id as the love-object" and thus gaining for itself this libido, i.e., by transforming object-libido into narcissistic libido. Identification is a means of accomplishing this transformation in that the object libido is desexualized or sublimated upon introjection of the object.<sup>107</sup> "After sublimation the erotic component no longer has the power to bind the whole of the destructiveness that was combined with it, and this is released in the form of an inclination to aggression and destruction."<sup>108</sup> Since the work of sublimation by the ego

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<sup>106</sup>XIX, 35.    <sup>107</sup>XIX, 46.    <sup>108</sup>Ibid.



results in a difusion of the instincts, aggression is liberated in the superego which uses them against the ego. The danger of maltreatment of the ego increases the tension between the superego and the ego, resulting in conscious or unconscious guilt. In melancholia, Freud discusses the superego's severe attacks on the ego, depicting it as a reflection of "a pure culture of the death instinct" in the superego.<sup>109</sup> Since sublimation liberates the death instinct in the superego even in the normal person, it is remarkable that the more a man checks his aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe (that is aggressive) he becomes in his ego ideal.<sup>110</sup>

Thus sublimation of the instincts increases the strength of the superego. This is particularly true when abandoned cathexes are very strong insofar as there is presumably more of the death instinct to be liberated. The severity of the superego is to be accounted for on this same basis, since "the more powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the domination of the superego over the ego later on--in the form of conscience or perhaps

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<sup>109</sup>XIX, 55.      <sup>110</sup>XIX, 53.

of unconscious sense of guilt."<sup>111</sup>

The question of why guilt is unconscious evokes from Freud the answer that the conscience lies closely to the Oedipus complex (which belongs to the unconscious id). The super-ego is less closely connected with consciousness than the remainder of the ego, due to this id-affinity. Resistance and negative therapeutic reactions are seen by Freud as demonstrating the existence of unconscious guilt "which is finding its satisfaction in the illness and refuses to give up the punishment of suffering."<sup>112</sup> Similarly "in many criminals, especially youthful ones, it is possible to detect a very powerful sense of guilt which existed before the crime. . . . It is as if it was a relief to be able to fasten this unconscious sense of guilt on to something real and immediate."<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>XIX, 54.      <sup>112</sup>XIX, 34-35.      <sup>113</sup>XIX, 49.

## THE SUPEREGO: 1924-1940

Some of what was left unsaid in "The Ego and The Id" is given in three short papers of 1924. They confirm impressively what was only adumbrated in the 1923 writing. Freud felt that in "The Ego and The Id" "the origin and role of the superego remained obscure and unelucidated."<sup>114</sup> He states succinctly that "neurosis is the result of a conflict between the ego and its id, whereas psychosis is the analagous outcome of a similar disturbance in the relations between the ego and the external world."<sup>115</sup> A common feature displayed in both neurosis and psychosis is the non-fulfillment or frustration of "wishes which are forever undefeated and which are so deeply rooted in our phylogenetically determined organization."<sup>116</sup> Consequently "the attitude of the superego should be taken into account. . . . in every form of psychical illness."<sup>117</sup> This is presumably because it "through a link that is not yet clear to us, unites in itself influences coming from the id as well as from the external world."<sup>118</sup>

In undertaking repression, "the ego is at bottom following the commands of its superego" and these commands "originate

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<sup>114</sup>XIX, 52.      <sup>115</sup>XIX, 149.      <sup>116</sup>Ibid.

<sup>117</sup>XIX, 151.      <sup>118</sup>XIX, 152.

from influences in the external world that have found representation in the superego."<sup>119</sup> Therefore, the ego conflicts with the id while serving the superego and reality. Freud thus posits that the commands of the superego and the outer world of reality are to be considered functionally equivalent in the process of repression. "The fact remains that the ego has taken sides with those powers."<sup>120</sup>

In the second paper of this year, "Economic Problem and Masochism," Freud continues this interest in functional equivalence. He states that the superego retains the essential features of the two parents--their strength, severity, inclination to supervise and punish.<sup>121</sup> The severity of the superego is increased "thanks to the diffusion of instinct which occurs along with this introduction into the ego."<sup>122</sup> Freud confirms the fact that the superego results from

the introjection into the ego of the first objects of the id's libidinal impulses--namely, the two parents. In this process the relation to these objects was desexualized; it was diverted from its direct sexual aims. Only in this way was it possible for the Oedipus complex to be surmounted.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>119</sup>XIX, 152-53.      <sup>120</sup>XIX, 150.      <sup>121</sup>Ibid.

<sup>122</sup>XIX, 167.      <sup>123</sup>Ibid.

Since the superego represents such an introjection and these same figures also belong to the outer world of reality, tradition and the influences of the past "become one of the most strongly-felt manifestations of reality."<sup>124</sup> As the child moves toward autonomy, detaching himself from the parents, the personal significance for the superego recedes into the background.

To the images they leave behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities, self-chosen models and publicly recognized heroes, whose figures need no longer be introjected by an ego which has become more resistant.<sup>125</sup>

It appears then that the influence of later powerful personalities is not explained by Freud on the basis of incorporative identification but through being "linked" to the remnant "images."<sup>126</sup>

Instinctual renunciation in childhood is reinforced by the presence of external parental power. Morality results as it leads to the repression of the Oedipus complex. "Conscience and morality have risen through the overcoming, desexualization, of the Oedipus complex."<sup>127</sup> The expression of morality is the conscience. The price of attaining morality or conscience is further renunciation of

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<sup>124</sup>Ibid.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid.

<sup>126</sup>XIX, 168.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid.

expression of destructive impulses. This is "taken up by the superego . . . and increases its sadism against the ego."<sup>128</sup> Consequently the sense of guilt results from the "suppression of an instinct" and "a person's conscience becomes more severe and more sensitive the more he refrains from aggression against others."<sup>129</sup> This line of discussion was presented in "The Ego and The Id," but here it is condensed, clarified and the general term "renunciation" is used instead of "sublimation."

Conscience and morality arise through the desexualization of the relations with the parents. Guilt and sadism of the superego against the ego in "moral masochism" are explained by Freud on the basis of morality becoming "sexualized once more" and the Oedipus complex revived, leaving the way open for a "regression from morality to the Oedipus complex."<sup>130</sup> Thus another clinical syndrome is added to those we have considered previously as having significant relationship to the superego and its functions.

Having elucidated some of the functions of the superego, Freud turns to the problem of its genesis in "The Passing of the Oedipus Complex." He states that "the Oedipus complex reveals its importance as the central phenomenon

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<sup>128</sup>XIX, 169.    <sup>129</sup>XIX, 170.    <sup>130</sup>Ibid.

of the sexual period of early childhood; it succumbs to repression . . . and if followed by the latency period."<sup>131</sup> Just what it is that brings about the destruction of the Oedipus complex "has not yet become clear."<sup>132</sup> Freud presents three general reasons for the process of dissolution of the complex. First, "analysis seems to show that it is the experience of painful disappointments."<sup>133</sup> Among these possibilities "in opposition to the content of the complex"<sup>134</sup> are included the punishment from the father of the girl and the arrival of a new sibling. These distressing experiences may be considered to be a disappointment. Second: another reason for the dissolution is "the absence of the satisfaction hoped for."<sup>135</sup> Even if no special events occur (such as punishments or siblings), the frustration of the wish must "in the end lead the small lover to turn away from his hopeless longing."<sup>136</sup> Thus, "the Oedipus complex would go to its destruction from its lack of success, from the effects of its internal impossibility."<sup>137</sup> Third, "the Oedipus complex must collapse because the time has come for its disintegration." The Oedipus complex is a "phenomenon which is determined and

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<sup>131</sup>XIX, 169.

<sup>132</sup>XIX, 173.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid.

<sup>136</sup>Ibid.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid.

laid down by heredity and which is bound to pass away according to the programme when the next preordained phase of development sets in."<sup>138</sup> Although this phylogenetic view is more "far reaching," there is room for the ontogenetic view side by side with it. "It remains of interest to follow out how this innate programme is carried out and in what way accidental nexae exploit his disposition."<sup>139</sup> Freud continues by tracing this "exploitation" for the male and female. The Oedipus complex is contemporaneous with the phallic phase. Expression of the complex can be in either a passive or active way. The active mode is by taking the father's place in intercourse with the mother. The passive mode is the child supplanting the mother and being loved himself by the father. During this phallic phase, masturbation is practiced and disapproved by parents. Castration becomes a threat but is disbelieved. Unbelief breaks down when the child observes the female genitals; castration threat becomes a reality. The child recognizes either mode of behavior, active or passive, results in loss of penis, resulting in a conflict arising between the narcissistic interest in this part of the body and the libidinal cathexis of the parent-objects. Normally, in this conflict the first of these forces triumphs

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<sup>138</sup>XIX, 174.

<sup>139</sup>Ibid.



and the ego of the child turns away from the Oedipus complex. The subsequent introjection of the authority of the father or the parents:

forms the nucleus of the superego, which takes over the severity of the father and perpetuates his prohibitions against incest, and so secures the ego from the return of the libidinal object-cathexis. . . . The whole process has . . . preserved the genital organ--has averted the danger of its loss--and, on the other, has paralysed it--has removed its function. This process ushers in the latency period, which now interrupts the child's sexual development.<sup>140</sup>

In the case of the girl, the "castration complex" precedes the resolution of the Oedipus problem, rather than being a reason for it. Freud believes the girl's Oedipus complex is much simpler than the boy's. "In my experience, it (Oedipus complex) seldom goes beyond the taking of her mother's place and the adopting of a feminine attitude towards her father."<sup>141</sup> She recognizes that she has "come off badly" by comparison with the boy. She explains her loss "by assuming that at some earlier date she had possessed an equally large organ and had then lost it by castration."<sup>142</sup> She accepts it as an accomplished fact. "Her Oedipus complex culminates in a desire . . . to receive a baby from her father as a gift."<sup>143</sup> The wish is

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<sup>140</sup>XIX, 176-77.    <sup>141</sup>XIX, 178.    <sup>142</sup>Ibid.

<sup>143</sup>XIX, 179.

never fulfilled, and the infantile Oedipus complex is then gradually given up. Freud readily admits that this explanation of the female's development is unsatisfactory: "It must be admitted . . . that in general our insight into these developmental processes in girls is unsatisfactory, incomplete and vague."<sup>144</sup>

Despite this admission of inadequacy, these three papers continue consolidating the burgeoning forth of ideas in "The Ego and The Id." In them, we find confirmation of the point that the identification producing the superego is indeed of the incorporative style; improvement in the exposition of the strengthening of the superego through instinctual renunciation; a listing of the conditions for the dissolution of the Oedipus complex; integrated presentation of this process for the male child; specifications of the fact that introjection of later authorities is of secondary nature; and further remarks on the phylogenetic-ontogenetic issue.

In "The Ego and The Id" Freud claims that the ego is confronted by three dangers: from the external world, the superego, and the libido of the id. Correspondingly, Freud differentiated three<sup>145</sup> types of anxiety: reality anxiety,

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<sup>144</sup>Ibid.

<sup>145</sup>XIX, 56-57.

moral anxiety,<sup>146</sup> and neurotic anxiety. The external world of reality forces the ego into separating from its instinctual roots. This demand of reality is experienced by the ego as separation anxiety. The situations of birth, weaning, Oedipal complex, and adolescence all have the common factor of being experiences of separation. In each case the most immediate experience of the ego is anxiety. And anxiety produces repression and not as Freud previously held that repression produces anxiety.<sup>147</sup> Anxiety, being the "motive force" to repression, indicates that the superego can initiate repression only by arousing anxiety in the ego. "Moral anxiety" is the term that Freud gives to that anxiety initiated by the superego. However the superego becomes the initiator of repression only in the sense that the ego anticipates the superego's criticism and accomplishes a repression in order to avoid the severity of the superego's accusations.

In Freud's delineation of moral anxiety, he introduces a

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<sup>146</sup>XVIII, 128. The German word is "Gewissenangst" which means literally "conscience anxiety." This term is difficult to translate into English. In common parley it means no more than "qualms of conscience." But the factor of anxiety in the concept is stressed in Freud's usage. Sometimes it might be translated "fear of conscience" where there is no distinction drawn between conscience and "superego."

<sup>147</sup>XVIII, 109.

new concept adumbrated in "The Ego and The Id."<sup>148</sup> It is the concept of aggression and its importance in the development of the superego. Prior to the essays or "Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety," Freud had always theorized that repression was against the libidinal instincts. His new view is that "the instincts fall into two groups."<sup>149</sup> And the "aggressive impulse flows mainly from the destructive instinct; and we have always believed that in a neurosis it is against the demands of the libido and not against those of any other instinct that the ego is defending itself."<sup>150</sup> But as the two instincts are "scarcely ever pure instinctual impulses but mixtures in various proportions,"<sup>151</sup> the aggressive instincts are as much subject to repression as the libidinal ones.

In view of the new theoretical formulations and the role of anxiety in repression, the development of the superego must be re-evaluated. In each cycle of life and development, the human organism experiences different dangers.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>148</sup>XIX, 54ff.    <sup>149</sup>XX, 125.    <sup>150</sup>XX, 124.

<sup>151</sup>XX, 125.

<sup>152</sup>Robert Havighurst, in his Developmental Tasks and Education (New York: Longmans and Green, 1952), explains the developmental task grows out of this conception of anxiety as characteristic to various stages of growth. The developmental task is defined on one side by the psychological needs of the individual and on the other side by

The prototype of all situations of danger is the trauma of birth. "The 'primal anxiety' of birth"<sup>153</sup> is the earliest anxiety of all. Because of the undeveloped nature of the infant, the organism is not able to cope with large amounts of stimulation. This situation is experienced as a danger, the feeling of "non-satisfaction, of a growing tension due to need, against which it is helpless."<sup>154</sup> Anxiety from such overwhelming stimulation is seen transferred to anxiety at the loss of the love object, the mother. "It is the absence of the mother that is now the danger; and as soon as that danger arises the infant gives the signal of anxiety."<sup>155</sup> Soon the child senses the father as a powerful rival for the love object; anxiety arises that the father will destroy the child's capacity for erotic satisfaction with the mother. "The danger is of being separated from one's genitals."<sup>156</sup> This paternal threat to the child gives rise to aggressive feelings toward the father which in turn must be checked. The tension and conflict set up within the ego can be resolved only by the ego's splitting itself.<sup>157</sup> What is set up in the psyche thereby is an

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the social structures, patterns of behavior, and values which are imposed by society.

<sup>153</sup>XX, 137.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>XX, 138.

<sup>156</sup>XX, 139.

<sup>157</sup>XX, 97.

intra-psychic monitor, the superego, to prevent expression of the aggressive impulses. Once the superego is established, it becomes the locus of narcissism, the waker of anxiety, the constant source of criticism and guilt, and the indirect instigator of repression. "With the depersonalization of the parental agency from which castration was feared, the danger becomes less defined. Castration anxiety develops into moral anxiety."<sup>158</sup> In its innermost meaning, superego anxiety is castration anxiety. And separation from this superego now becomes the danger situation and the source of anxiety.

This "depersonalization of the parental agency" means that in the post-Oedipal phase or latency period the superego is "depersonalized." The switch in content is from respect for the father to respect for authority in general. For in the normal course of development, castration anxiety and fear of the father is transformed into moral anxiety and respect for authority. Usually depersonalization of the superego occurs because the child cannot tolerate the anxiety aroused by the aggressive thoughts directed toward the feared father. Primary aggression finds a substitute outlet in impersonal authority. From that time forward the

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<sup>158</sup>xx, 139.

disapproval of the depersonalized superego arouses the anxiety that the original threat of castration evoked. The depersonalization of the superego (introjecting various "social prototypes")<sup>159</sup> follows the pattern of the original introjection of the father into the superego. In puberty the maturing superego is made up of the primary parental introjects along with the secondary introjection of models and values from society at large.

The "advent of puberty opens a decisive chapter," for the physiological changes reawaken the danger of unwanted libidinal impulses as well as early aggressive impulses.<sup>160</sup> "In consequence of the erotic trends . . . the struggle against sexuality will henceforward be carried on under the banner of ethical principles. The ego will recoil with astonishment from the promptings to cruelty and violence which enter consciousness from the id, and it has no notion that in them it is combating erotic wishes . . . The over-strict superego insists all the more strongly on the suppression of sexuality, since this has assumed such repellent forms."<sup>161</sup>

Characteristic situations of danger therefore exist for each

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<sup>159</sup>XX, 137.    <sup>160</sup>XX, 116.    <sup>161</sup>XX, 116.

of the various stages of life. Freud summarizes these dangers succinctly.

. . . we might say that each period of the individual's life has its appropriate determinant of anxiety. Thus the danger of psychical helplessness is appropriate to the period of life when his ego is immature; the danger of loss of object, to early childhood when he is still dependent on others; the danger of castration, to the phallic phase; and the fear of the superego, to the latency period. Nevertheless, all these danger-situations and determinants of anxiety can persist side by side and cause the ego to react to them with anxiety at a period later than the appropriate one; or, again, several of them can come into operation at the same time.<sup>162</sup>

Freud also discusses "the exaggerations of normal formation"<sup>163</sup> in elaborating an abnormal superego. The superego in its normal development occurs when the original castration anxiety is replaced by a more generalized social or moral anxiety.<sup>164</sup> This social anxiety is a result of identifications with social authority prototypes beyond the family constellation. The presence of these identifications indicate a duality within the superego organization. The primitive superego derives from familial anxiety and the depersonalized superego (the post-Oedipal superego) from social anxiety. Freud no longer holds at this stage that social anxiety is a mere projection of psychic forces. Rather he contends social anxiety is a consequence of reality anxiety legitimately taken into the ego. In contrast

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<sup>162</sup>XX, 142.    <sup>163</sup>XX, 115.    <sup>164</sup>XX, 139.



to this more normal development, Freud elaborates on the abnormal superego which occurs when castration anxiety is so strong as to paralyze the ego in its capacity to grow. Abnormally strong repression brings about a breakdown of the "genital (phallic) level of libidinal organization,"<sup>165</sup> and a regression to the "earlier sadistic-anal level."<sup>166</sup> There is correspondingly in this regression a severe superego which cannot "dissociate itself from the regression and difusion. . . . it becomes harsher, unkind, and more tormenting than where development has been normal."<sup>167</sup> Freud labeled this accusing, tormenting, judgmental activity of the superego the conscience. The judgmental and critical activity of this conscience is especially intense in the adolescent obsessional neurotic<sup>168</sup> which in exaggerated form points out a universal characteristic of the superego.

TWO PAPERS: 1928

Two papers published in 1928 contain brief but significant references to the work of the superego. In "Humour" Freud ponders how it is possible for a man to ward off suffering by adopting a humorous attitude toward himself. He decides

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<sup>165</sup>xx, 106.      <sup>166</sup>xx, 113.      <sup>167</sup>xx, 115-16.

<sup>168</sup>xx, 116.

that this humorous attitude can be explained "if we assume that it consists in the humorist's having withdrawn the psychical accent from his ego and having transposed it on to his superego."<sup>169</sup> He concludes:

To the superego, thus inflated, the ego can appear tiny and all its interests trivial; and, with this new distribution of energy, it may become an easy matter for the superego to suppress the ego's possibilities of reacting.<sup>170</sup>

However, if it is the superego that speaks such "kindly words of comfort to the intimidated ego, this will teach us that we have still a great deal to learn about the nature of the superego."<sup>171</sup> The superego which tries via humour to "console the ego and protect it from suffering" does not negate or contradict the fact of its genesis within the parental agency.

The second paper published, "Dostoevsky and Patricide," reviews briefly the problems of the Oedipal situation. Included in the consideration is the postulate of ambivalence and that of bisexuality. Ambivalence stems from the boy's relationship with his father in that the boy wishes to get rid of the father as a rival and in the boy's wish to be like his father. The further complication of bisexuality contributes the other factor in that the boy

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<sup>169</sup>XXI, 164.    <sup>170</sup>Ibid.    <sup>171</sup>XXI, 166.

wishes also to put himself in the mother's place and "take over her role as the object of his father's love."<sup>172</sup> The hatred of the father is unacceptable because of the castration threat, whether as punishment for having the mother or as the price of love. Consequently both the active and the passive wishes in the boy are repressed under the threat of castration; identification with the father "finally makes a permanent place for itself in the ego."<sup>173</sup> The result is that

the passivity which was supposed to have been repressed is re-established. The superego has become sadistic, and the ego becomes masochistic--that is to say, at bottom passive in a feminine way. A great need for punishment develops in the ego, which in part offers itself as a victim to Fate, and in part finds satisfaction in ill-treatment by the superego (that is in the sense of guilt). For every punishment is ultimately castration, and, as such, a fulfillment of the old passive attitude towards the father.<sup>174</sup>

Thus the tension and conflict between the content of the ego and the separate agency called the superego once again mirrors the previous relationship between the external parental authority and the ego.

#### "CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENT"

In 1930 Freud published a book on a sociological subject, finally entitled in English, "Civilization and Its

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<sup>172</sup>XXI, 183.      <sup>173</sup>XXI, 184.      <sup>174</sup>XXI, 185.

Discontents." The main theme is the irremediable antagonism between the demands of instinct and the prohibitions of civilization. Because of Freud's investigation of the ego and ego-anxiety which led him to his hypothesis of the superego and its origins from the individual's earliest object-relations, the present work was able to explore two side issues of extreme importance. The first concerned the clarification of the sense of guilt. Freud declares that it is "my intention to represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem in the development of civilization and to show that the price we pay for our advance on civilization is to a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt."<sup>175</sup> And this,<sup>176</sup> in turn, is the ground laid for the second side issue of great importance--the destructive instinct.

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<sup>175</sup>XXI, 134.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid. Freud added at this point a footnote of considerable interest. "'Thus conscience does make cowards of us all . . .'" That the education of young people at the present day conceals from them the part which sexuality will play in their lives is not the only reproach which we are obliged to make against it. Its other sin is that it does not prepare them for the aggressiveness of why they are destined to become the objects. In sending the young out into life with such a false psychological orientation, education is behaving as though one were to equip people starting on a Polar expedition with summer clothing and maps of the Italian Lakes. In this it becomes evident that a certain misuse is being made of ethical demands. The strictness of those demands would not do so much harm

The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves and justly assume to be present in others, is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbour and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure (of energy). In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests. Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical reaction-formations. Hence, therefore, the use of methods intended to incite people into identifications and aim-inhibited relationships of love, hence restriction upon sexual life, and hence too the ideal's commandment which is really justified by the fact that nothing else runs so strongly counter to the original nature of man.<sup>177</sup>

The aggressive instinct or the primary self-destructive death instinct is used by Freud to reinterpret his theoretical formulations on the concept of the superego and conscience. It became his contention that the crystallization of the superego issued from a redirection of the destructive impulses.

Freud begins his investigation with a germinal question.

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if education were to say: 'This is how men ought to be, in order to be happy and to make others happy; but you have to reckon on their not being like that.' Instead of this the young are made to believe that everyone else fulfills those ethical demands--that is, that everyone else is virtuous. It is on this that the demand is based that the young too, shall become virtuous."

<sup>177</sup>XXI, 112.

"What means does civilization employ in order to inhibit the aggressiveness which opposes it, to make it harmless, to get rid of it, perhaps?"<sup>178</sup> His reconsideration of the problem of instinctual renunciation and superego contained in this question is answered generally that the destructive impulses and aggression are internalized, taken over by the superego and directed inwardly against the ego. Now in the form of "conscience" it is "ready to put into action against the ego the same harsh aggressiveness that the ego would have liked to satisfy upon other, extraneous individuals."<sup>179</sup> However the specifics of the above question direct us once again to the origins of the superego and guilt.

Prior to the formation of the internal agency known as the superego, instinctual renunciation of the aggressive impulses is effected through dread of aggression by an external authority. In reality "that is, of course, tantamount to the dread of loss of love, for love is a protection against these punitive aggressions."<sup>180</sup> Consequently if the child loses the love of the person upon whom he is dependent, he is left highly vulnerable to a variety of dangers. Therefore at the beginning whatever causes one to

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<sup>178</sup>XXI, 123.    <sup>179</sup>Ibid.    <sup>180</sup>XXI, 128.

be threatened with loss of love is bad. At this stage in development,

. . . it makes little difference whether one has already done the bad thing or only intends to do it. In either case the danger only sets in if and when the authority discovers it, and in either case the authority would behave in the same way.<sup>181</sup>

At this stage in development also, the sense of guilt is only the dread of losing love, and it is labeled by Freud as "social anxiety." This anxiety abates when temptation has been resisted, when renunciation occurs.

Following the establishment of the internal agency monitor, instinctual renunciation of the superego occurs due to the dread of this internal authority or conscience. The superego now "torments the sinful ego with the same feeling of anxiety and is on the watch for opportunities of getting it punished by the external world."<sup>182</sup> This dread or anxiety may now be called properly, "guilt." The superego carries on the severity of the external authority, but now there is a difference. Renunciation of instinctual gratification is not enough, "for the wish persists and cannot be concealed from the superego. Thus, in spite of renunciation that has been made, a sense of guilt comes about."<sup>183</sup> And guilt persists.

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<sup>181</sup>XXI, 124.      <sup>182</sup>XXI, 125.      <sup>183</sup>XXI, 127.

Instinctual renunciation now no longer has a completely liberating effect; virtuous continence is no longer rewarded with the assurance of love. A threatened external unhappiness--loss of love and punishment on the part of the external authority--has been exchanged for a permanent internal unhappiness, for the tension of the sense of guilt.<sup>184</sup>

The establishment of the superego is the point in a life history when an individual begins to experience genuine guilt. With this new internal authority established, the ideals and prohibitions of society are introjected into the personality itself and joined to an inversion of the destructive-aggressive instinct.

Thus we know of two origins of the sense of guilt: one arising from fear of an authority, and the other, later on, arising from the fear of the superego. The first insists upon a renunciation of instinctual satisfactions; the second, as well as doing this, presses for punishment, since the continuance of the forbidden wishes cannot be concealed from the superego.<sup>185</sup>

In restating his argument regarding the abandonment of instinctual satisfactions leading to an increase in the severity and intolerance of the superego, he notes a theoretical contradiction. If the renunciation severity of the superego delineation is correct, then the severity of the superego at the time of its formation might as well come from this operation as from the aggression of parental authority. As Freud states:

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<sup>184</sup>XXI, 127-28.

<sup>185</sup>XXI, 127.



The . . . contradiction concerned the aggressive energy with which we suppose the superego to be endowed. According to one view, that energy merely carried on the punitive energy of the external authority and keeps it alive in the mind; while according to another view, it consists, on the contrary, of one's own aggressive energy which has not been used and which one now directs against that inhibiting authority.<sup>186</sup>

This contradiction is resolved through arguing that it is essentially not a contradiction at all. What it amounts to is that in "the formation of the superego and the emergence of a conscience innate constitutional factors and influences from the real environment act in combination."<sup>187</sup> Environmentally this means that the amount of aggression evoked but unexpressed in the child might also be a function of the aggressiveness of the external authority. The severity of the superego reflects most directly the innate constitutional impulses of aggression and destruction. And at the same time, this superego reflects secondarily the aggressiveness of the parents. The strength of the superego results from a coalescence of these constitutional and environmental factors.

In a footnote regarding two types of pathogenic methods of upbringing, Freud agrees with Franz Alexander's work in connection with Aichhorn's study of delinquency.

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<sup>186</sup>XXI, 138.

<sup>187</sup>XXI, 130.

The "unduly lenient and indulgent father" is the cause of children's forming an over-severe superego, because under the impression of the love that they receive, they have no other outlet for their aggressiveness but turning it inwards. In delinquent children, who have been brought up without love, the tension between ego and superego is lacking, and the whole of their aggressiveness can be directed outwards. Apart from a constitutional factor which may be supposed to be present, it can be said, therefore, that a severe conscience arises from the joint operation of two factors: the frustration of instinct, which unleashes aggressiveness, and the experience of being loved, which turns the aggressiveness inwards and hands it over to the superego.<sup>188</sup>

All renunciation of aggression in the process of the formation of the superego and after its formation, results in a greater severity of conscience and greater sense of guilt. And once the superego is erected, the aggressiveness of the superego is the aggressiveness of the introjected father-authority plus that liberated in further instinctual renunciation.

In this way Freud states "it is after all only the aggressiveness which is transformed into a sense of guilt, by being suppressed and made over to the superego."<sup>189</sup> Before the phylogenetic development of the superego (as in the case of the society of brothers in the primal horde), this sense of guilt was the same thing as remorse which is the emotional reaction after an actual performance of an act of

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> XXI, 138.

aggression or destruction. But the superego knows no distinction between intended and committed aggressive acts; both evoke a sense of guilt.

Freud clarifies his position with a glossary-like summary which is worth noting.

The superego is an agency which has been inferred by us, and conscience is a function which we ascribe, among other functions, to that agency. This function consists in keeping watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and judging them, in exercising a censorship. The sense of guilt, the harshness of the superego, is thus the same thing as the severity of the conscience. It is the perception which the ego has of being watched over in this way, the assessment of the tension between its own strivings and the demands of the superego. The fear of this critical agency (a fear which is at the bottom of the whole relationship), the need for punishment, is an instinctual manifestation on the part of the ego, which has become masochistic under the influence of a sadistic superego; . . . We ought not to speak of a conscience until a superego is demonstrably present. As to a sense of guilt, we must admit that it is in existence before the superego, and therefore before conscience, too. At that time it is the immediate expression of fear of the external authority, a recognition of the tension between the ego and that authority. . . . Remorse is the general term for the ego's reaction in a case of sense of guilt. . . . it is itself a punishment and can include the need for punishment. Thus remorse, too, can be older than conscience.<sup>190</sup> (underlining mine.)

The only other function of the superego that receives recognition in "Civilization and Its Discontents" is called "cultural superego."<sup>191</sup> The cultural restrictions against

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<sup>190</sup>XXI, 136-37, (underlinings mine). <sup>191</sup>XXI, 141ff.

potential destructiveness in a society form a pattern comparable to the superego within the individual. The cultural superego is like the superego within in at least two ways. "It is based on the impression left behind by the personalities of great leaders--men of overwhelming force of mind . . . In many instances the analogy goes still further, in that during their lifetime these figures were . . . maltreated . . . and . . . dispatches. . . . In the same way, indeed, the primal father did not attain divinity until long after he had met his death with violence."<sup>192</sup> Freud adds that Jesus Christ is "the most arresting example of this fateful conjunction."<sup>193</sup> The second way cultural and individual superego agree is that "the former, just like the latter, sets up strict ideal demands."<sup>194</sup> The cultural superego is a system of ideals and standards organized to restrict man's innate destructive tendencies, the restriction of which is necessary for survival. The system and elaboration of these ideals and restrictions is "comprised under the heading of ethics."<sup>195</sup>

People have at all times set the greatest value on ethics, as though they expected that it in particular would produce especially important results. And it does in fact deal with a subject which can easily be recognized as the sorest spot in every civilization.

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<sup>192</sup>XXI, 141-42.    <sup>193</sup>XXI, 142.    <sup>194</sup>Ibid.

<sup>195</sup>Ibid.

Ethics is thus to be regarded as a therapeutic attempt --as an endeavour to achieve, by means of a command of the superego, something which has so far not been achieved by means of any other cultural activities.<sup>196</sup>

"Objections can be made against the ethical demands of the cultural superego," according to Freud. He believed the ethical-legalistic approach a failure therapeutically in three ways: (1) "It troubles itself too little about happiness of the ego. . . ."<sup>197</sup> the economics of the pleasure principle; (2) It fails to comprehend the "instinctual strength of the id"; and (3) It fails to recognize "the difficulties presented by the real external environment."<sup>198</sup> "The commandment, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself' is the strongest defense against human aggressiveness and . . . the commandment is impossible to fulfill."<sup>199</sup> Freud claims that ethical demands and legalistic requirements produce revolt and increase neurosis. "Under the influence of cultural urges . . . civilization--possibly the whole of mankind--have become neurotic."<sup>200</sup>

#### "NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES"

In the year 1933 Freud published a new book of lectures, which, he points out in the preface, do not stand on their

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<sup>196</sup>Ibid.

<sup>197</sup>XXI, 142-43.

<sup>198</sup>Ibid.

<sup>199</sup>Ibid.

<sup>200</sup>XXI, 144.

own two legs but are essentially supplements. Among the welter of topics and personal views, two chapters are relevant to the problem of superego development. In the chapter, "The Dissection of the Pyschical Personality," Freud reviews his work in ego-psychology in summary fashion. In general the argument has changed little, but there are new emphases including his discussion of the development of the superego. The demands of the parents become the demands of the superego. Along with parental demands goes the threat of loss of love; the child defends against such threats by internalizing the external restraint.

The part which is later taken on by the super-ego is played to begin with by an external power, by parental authority. Parental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love and are bound to be feared on their own account. This realistic anxiety is the precursor of later moral anxiety. So long as it is dominant there is no need to talk of a super-ego and of a conscience. It is only subsequently that the secondary situation develops (which we are all too ready to regard as the normal one), where the external restraint is internalized and the super-ego takes the place of the parental agency and observes, directs and threatens the ego in exactly the same way as earlier the parents did with the child.<sup>201</sup>

The new emphasis in this, unlike previous accounts, is upon the "loss of love" rather than "castration anxiety."

Freud also reiterated his earlier discussion on identification, that the "superego can be described as a successful

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<sup>201</sup>XXII, 62.

instance of identification with the parental agency."<sup>202</sup>

The strongest evidence for the process of identification in the development of the superego is the fact that it is the "heir of that emotional attachment,"<sup>203</sup> the Oedipal situation.

With his abandonment of the Oedipus complex a child must, as we can see, renounce the intense object-cathexis which he has deposited with his parents, and it is as a compensation for this loss of objects that there is such a strong intensification of the identifications with his parents which have probably long been present in his ego.<sup>204</sup>

That the superego exists indicates that identification was successful. The superego, however, remains inadequate and underdeveloped if the Oedipus complex is not completely resolved.

As the child grows older, the "superego also takes on the influences of those who have stepped into the place of parents--educators, teachers, people chosen as ideal models."<sup>205</sup> In this process of impersonalization of the ambivalence toward the original parents, the superego takes over the values of those who replace the parents. But how the superego is modified in this way, is, again, not specified. In fact, the situation is all the more

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<sup>202</sup>XXII, 63-64.      <sup>203</sup>XXII, 64.      <sup>204</sup>Ibid.

<sup>205</sup>Ibid.

ambiguous with the statement that:

Identifications then come about with these later parents as well, and indeed they regularly make important contributions to the formation of character; but in that case they only affect the ego, they no longer influence the super-ego, which has been determined by the earliest parental images.<sup>206</sup>

In "New Introductory Lectures," Freud re-instates the concept of the ego ideal as a separate activity. Rather than being synonymous with the "superego," it is a function which is to be attributed to the superego. The superego

. . . is also the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfill. . . . This ego ideal is the precipitate of the old picture of the parents, the expression of admiration for the perfection which the child then attributed to them.<sup>207</sup>

Freud continues delving into the problem of the superego by reviewing it in the study of group psychology. It is the superego which allows a group cohesiveness because it has the common introjection of a single ego ideal. "A psychological group is a collection of individuals who have introduced the same person into their superego and on the basis of this common element, have identified with one another in their ego."<sup>208</sup> The superego becomes the vehicle of tradition and internalized values from generation to generation. That means that the individual through his superego

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<sup>206</sup>Ibid.

<sup>207</sup>XXII, 65.

<sup>208</sup>XXII, 67.



is subject to ideologies which are passed from one generation to the next,

Mankind never lives entirely in the present. The past, the tradition of the race and of the people, lives on in the ideologies of the super-ego, and yields only slowly to the influence of the present and to new changes; and so long as it operates through the super-ego it plays a powerful part in human life . . .<sup>209</sup>

The second chapter of this book significant for our understanding of the development of the superego, is one entitled, "Femininity." "Throughout history people have knocked their heads against the riddle of the nature of femininity" including, we might add, Freud himself.<sup>210</sup> Ignoring his own warnings, Freud ventures forth into the riddle of femininity through the Oedipus situation in the female. He reiterates his emphasis on the strength of the girl's pre-Oedipal attachment to the mother. In the phallic phase of development the object of the girl's active (masculine) strivings is to get the mother with child; of her passive (feminine) strivings, to have a child by the mother. Besides the problem of bisexuality, the relationship is made complex by the factor of ambivalence present in all emotional attachments: they are "both affectionate and hostile nature."<sup>211</sup> The girl child identifies with the mother during this period. The significant

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid.      <sup>210</sup> XXII, 113.      <sup>211</sup> XXII, 120.

question raised again becomes "how does a girl pass from her mother to an attachment to her father?"<sup>212</sup> Freud reviews the previously advanced suggestions for the change from mother to father, in object-choice in the Oedipal phase, including ambivalence. Freud rejects them with the conclusion that they apply equally as well to the boy. Having thus withdrawn the factor of ambivalence as the key to the riddle, Freud reinstates his by now familiar arguments concerning the replacement of the wish for a penis by the wish for a child.<sup>213</sup> Following the girl's intense pre-Oedipal attachments to the mother, the Oedipal situation is a "haven of refuge."<sup>214</sup> Unlike the boy in fear of castration, "the chief motive is lacking" to overcome the Oedipus complex.

Girls remain in (the Oedipal situation) for an indeterminate length of time; they demolish it late and, even so, incompletely. In these circumstances the formation of the superego must suffer; it cannot attain the strength and independence which give it its cultural significance.<sup>215</sup>

Consequently the superego is never to be so strong in the girl as in the boy.

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<sup>212</sup>XXII, 119.      <sup>213</sup>XXII, 128.      <sup>214</sup>XXII, 129.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid.

While Freud does not elaborate, he also states that an identification with the mother does occur during the period of the Oedipal.

A woman's identification with her mother allows us to distinguish two strata: the pre-Oedipus one which rests on her affectionate attachment to her mother and takes her as a model, and the later one from the Oedipus complex which seeks to get rid of her mother and take her place with the father. We are no doubt justified in saying that much of both of them is left over for the future and that neither of them is adequately surmounted in the course of development. But the phase of the affectionate pre-Oedipus attachment is the decisive one for a woman's future: during it preparations are made for the acquisition of the characteristics with which she will later fulfill her role in the sexual function and perform her invaluable social tasks.<sup>216</sup>

Freud evidently holds that the second identification is not seen as sufficient to produce a strong superego, because the Oedipus complex is not completely resolved. "If you want to know more about femininity, enquire from your own experiences of life or turn to the poets . . ."<sup>217</sup>

RELATED WRITINGS: 1938-1940

When the work, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis," was first published in 1938 it became immediately apparent that it was not a book for beginners. Rather it is something like a "refresher course" for advanced students of psychology.

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<sup>216</sup>XXII, 134.

<sup>217</sup>XXII, 135.

Freud's general approach to psychology is assumed, as well as specifics of certain theories. In reiterating the investigation on the superego,<sup>218</sup> Freud only re-emphasizes

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<sup>218</sup>It is relevant to note at this point that the viewpoint of Melanie Klein regarding the timing of the internalization and structuralization of the superego differs sharply from Freud. In an essay of Melanie Klein's, "The Early Development of Conscience in the Child," found in Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921-1945 (London: Hogarth Press, 1948), p. 270, she reiterates her view that there exists in the child a full superego of the utmost harshness and cruelty, before the resolution of the Oedipus complex. She states that the fears of the external world which the small child displays are due to the fact that the child views the world fantastically under the influence of this cruel superego. The child's first "imagos" are endowed with tremendous sadism, stemming from the death instinct. In childhood fears these terrifying imagos are reprojected. She postulates that the early function of the superego is to arouse anxiety, but as its severity is reduced, during the phallic phase of development (by the positive side of the child's attachment to the mother), so anxiety is transformed into guilt. (This concept is reintroduced and applied, supra p. 161.) According to Klein, the sense of guilt arises from the child's feeling that in sadistically attacking its mother's body, it is attacking and spoiling the source of good and also incidentally his father and brother and sisters contained in the mother's body. Social feeling develops she believes, from the urge to make reparation, to reconstruct and to repair the damage. Interestingly, she also differentiates the conscience from the superego, the conscience being established only after the resolution of the phallic Oedipus complex.

In a more recent essay written by Melanie Klein, Our Adult World and Its Roots in Infancy (London: Tavistock, 1960), p. 9, she states: "The superego--the part of the ego that criticizes and controls dangerous impulses, and that Freud first placed roughly in the fifth year of childhood--operates, according to my views, much earlier. It is my hypothesis that in the fifth or sixth month of life the baby becomes afraid of the harm his destructive impulses and his greed might do, or might have done, to his loved objects. For he cannot yet distinguish between his desires

inexplicably the importance of the "child's fear of loss of love, a fear the place of which has been taken by the moral agency."<sup>219</sup> The prolonged dependency of the human child on his parents and their care of him during dependency gives the child security against the dangers of the external world. The price of this security is the fear of the loss of protection, love, security. Loss of love "exerts a decisive influence on the outcome of the conflict when a boy finds himself in the situation of the Oedipus complex, in which the threat to his narcissism by the danger of castration, reinforced from primaeval sources, takes possession of him."<sup>220</sup> Freud was unclear as to how cultural acquisitions are deposited in the id, but he is more specific and positive regarding his theory of socialization.

Throughout later life it (the process of superego formation) represents the influence of a person's childhood, of the care and education given him by his parents and of his dependence on them. . . . a childhood which is prolonged so greatly in human beings by a family life is common. And in all this it is not only

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and impulses and their actual effects. He experiences feelings of guilt and the urge to preserve these objects and to make reparation to them for harm done. . . . Feelings of guilt, which occasionally arise in all of us, have very deep roots in infancy, and the tendency to make reparation plays an important role in our sublimations and object relations."

<sup>219</sup> XXIII, 206.

<sup>220</sup> XXIII, 200.

the personal qualities of these parents that is making itself felt, but also everything that had a determining effect on them themselves, the tastes and standards of the social class in which they live and the innate dispositions and traditions of the race from which they spring.<sup>221</sup>

Freud's concept of the superego is not adequate without full understanding of the cultural and traditional history surrounding the individual. However Freud objected to the generalization that the "superego . . . represents more than anything the cultural past." There are cultural acquisitions in the superego, but the superego should be seen as a "kind of intermediate position between the id and the external world; it unites in itself the influences of the present and the past."<sup>222</sup> This comment as others, is striking in its failure to consider the future. In fact the entire work of Freud shows an amazing failure to consider the phenomenology of the future.

The superego becomes the psychic representation of the external world which includes both the conscious and the unconscious attitude of the parents, and the influences of society and tradition. It stems out of the child's need to retain the love of the parent. The fear of conscience is a derivative of the earliest fear of the loss of love. Freud states: "So long as the ego works in complete

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<sup>221</sup>XXIII, 206.

<sup>222</sup>XXIII, 207.

agreement with the superego, it is not easy to distinguish between their manifestations; but tensions and estrangements between them become very plainly visible."<sup>223</sup> With this work, Freud's theory of the process of development of the superego is complete.

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<sup>223</sup>XXIII, 206.

**CHAPTER TWO:**  
**ADOLESCENCE AND THE EGO IDEAL**



## ADOLESCENCE

When sexual maturity becomes a fact, childhood comes to an end. The psychophysiological sexual development, the rapid and visible body changes and the concomitant mental growth usher in the period of turmoil known as adolescence. It is a period of conscious and unconscious upheavels, changes and realignments. In 1905 Freud wrote in his "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality" that puberty is a time of changes which give infantile sexual life its final shape. These changes consist in the full attainment of genital primacy over pregenital sexual drives. This transformation of the sexual instinct to adult sexual life is biologically strengthened.

The sexual instinct has hitherto been predominantly autoerotic; it now finds a sexual object. Its activity has hitherto been derived from a variety of separate instincts and erotogenic zones, which independently of one another have pursued a certain sort of pleasure as their sole sexual aim. Now a new sexual aim appears, and all the component instincts combine to attain it, while the erotogenic zones become subordinated to the primacy of the genital zone.<sup>1</sup>

Freud also listed as an adolescent event the setting up of new sexual aims. He states that by the reanimation of the Oedipus complex in puberty the process of non-incestuous

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<sup>1</sup>Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-64), VII, 207.

object finding comes to a completion during adolescence.

Freud postulated in "Three Essays" that the stage of development corresponding to the period between the ages of two and five must be regarded as an important precursor of the final organization in adolescence. E. Jones, elaborating on this idea, wrote in detail how "the individual recapitulates and expands in the second decennium of life the development he passed through during the first five years . . ."<sup>2</sup> Jones claimed that there was the difference in the "circumstances in which the development takes place" but went as far as propounding "the general law . . . that adolescence recapitulates infancy, and that the precise way in which a given person will pass through the necessary stages of development in adolescence is to a very great extent determined by the form of his infantile development."<sup>3</sup> In short: "these stages are passed through on different planes at the two periods of infancy and adolescence but in very similar ways in the same individual."<sup>4</sup> However, adolescence is not simply a repetition of the Oedipal and post-Oedipal period. Jones in his one sided

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<sup>2</sup>Ernest Jones, "Some Problems of Adolescence," in Papers on Psychoanalysis, 5th Edition (London: Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1948), p. 398.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 399.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

position fails to consider that the reanimated Oedipal strivings now interact with something quite new in the ego and superego. These two agencies in adolescence have "dimensions, contents, capacities and dependencies different from those of childhood."<sup>5</sup>

In adolescence, now for the first time, the psychic apparatus has at its disposal a ripening genital sexuality with adequate discharge for sexual tension. This unique phenomenon alone would stamp this stage of development as something new and not just a duplicate of an earlier age. With these anatomical and physiological genital changes, the attainment of genital primacy and the definitive completion of the "process of non-incestuous object finding" is possible. Now in this period of adolescence the incestuous sexual and hostile-aggressive wishes, which the Oedipal child had to repress in favor of affectionate attachments to the parents, must be finally relinquished. In fact, in order to insure the adolescent's future freedom of object choice, his affectionate ties to the parents also must be sufficiently loosened. Consequently there results in this process, a reaction which again has no

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<sup>5</sup> Anna Freud, Ego and Mechanisms of Defense (New York: International Universities Press, 1946), p. 153.

parallel in childhood. Quite simply, it is seen as a grief reaction.<sup>6</sup> What is demanded is a definite and final abandonment of his practical and mental dependency on his parents. Freud states that this detachment from parental authority is regarded as "one of the most significant, but also one of the most painful, psychical achievements."<sup>7</sup>

Due to the tremendous instinctual upheaval which occurs during puberty, some adolescents react by retreating. In an attempt to stop or ward off these overpowerful instinctual strivings, these adolescents call upon primitive defenses such as denial, introjection and projection.

#### ANNA FREUD

Any adult working with adolescents in a therapeutic encounter is well aware of the extremes which they display. "The adolescent is altruistic and egocentric, devoted and unfaithful, gregarious and solitary, blindly submissive to a leader and defiant of authority, idealistic and cynical, sensitive and callous, ascetic and libertine, optimistic and pessimistic, enthusiastic and indifferent."<sup>8</sup> Anna

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<sup>6</sup> Anna Freud, "Adolescence," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, XIII (1958), 262.

<sup>7</sup> S. Freud, op. cit., VII, 227.

<sup>8</sup> Maxwell Gitelson, "Character Synthesis: The

Freud too is extremely aware of their unpredictable manner as a result of her long interest and treatment of adolescents. She claims that understanding the turmoil of the period is made easier if we accept the fact that disharmony within the psychic structure is "par for the course." She states that the adolescent's reaction to the gross bodily changes and instinctual strivings may be both:

to fight his impulses and to accept them; to ward them off successfully and to be overrun by them; to love his parents and to hate them; to revolt against them and to be dependent on them; to be deeply ashamed to acknowledge his mother before others, and unexpectedly to desire heart-to-heart talks with her; to thrive on imitation of and identification with others while searching unceasingly for his own identity; to be more idealistic, artistic, generous and unselfish than he will ever be again, but also the opposite: self-centered, egoistic, calculating.<sup>9</sup>

Anna Freud is well known for her early discussion (1946) of two defense mechanisms that adolescent's resort to because their instinctual equilibrium is threatened. These are of course, asceticism and intellectualization. She says that the "ascetic" adolescent fights all his impulses, pre-Oedipal and Oedipal, sexual and aggressive. "Total war is waged against the pursuit of pleasure as such."<sup>10</sup> Total suppression of all instinctual gratification is what

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Psychotherapeutic Problem of Adolescence," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, XVIII (1948), 425.

<sup>9</sup>A. Freud, "Adolescence," P. 275. <sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 274.

asceticism attempts to do. If it occurs most of the normal processes of instinct and need satisfaction are interrupted if not paralyzed.

The second mechanism she analyzes is "intellectualization." She postulates that the role of the intellect in adolescence is primarily defensive.<sup>11</sup> While most of the transformations at puberty occur in instinctual and affective life, even general attitudes of the ego may develop into mechanisms of defense. She claims that the ego undergoes a secondary "modification" when it becomes engaged in the attempt to master the instincts and affects erupting in puberty. She states that in puberty the adolescent becomes more intelligent in contrast to latency and that his intellectual interests and abilities become keener. She has observed that there is a transition from the concrete interests of latency to more abstract interests in adolescence. These abstract interests met clinically, are seen in the adolescent's willingness to engage in long discussions on abstract, esoteric political, religious or philosophical themes. But according to her observations this development and interest makes little or no difference in the adolescent's behavior, which continues

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<sup>11</sup>A. Freud, Ego and Mechanisms of Defense, p. 172ff.

inconsistent with his esoteric ideas.

She concludes, consequently, that these intellectual interests and abilities, instead of representing intellectuality in the usual sense, center on subjects or ideas that have given rise to conflicts between the ego and superego, or between the superego and the id. To her, intellectualization at puberty really represents then a thinking over of the instinctual conflicts as a means of mastering them, but on another psychic level. She stipulates that ordinarily this is not the characteristic way for "psychic institutions" to function. To master the instincts by means of thought is seen by her as an exaggeration of the ego's general function.

Her general formulations on the turmoil and phenomena of adolescence are based naturally on the constructs introduced by S. Freud in his monograph, "The Ego and The Id." The concepts are of course ego, superego and id.<sup>12</sup> What her formulations do not consider is the possibility of epigenetic development of ego and superego in adolescence. Her understanding of ego and superego development is generally related to the defensive activity of an adolescent. An autonomous development at puberty of new

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 149-90.

potentialities for abstract thinking unrelated to defense mechanisms is bypassed. She simply makes an analogy between the abstract thinking of adolescence and of early childhood, as if they were one and the same thing. Developmental psychology and research contradicts this assumption, particularly the investigations of Inhelder and Piaget. They present research evidence on the development of cognitive potentialities newly emerging which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of defense.

Her theoretical formulations on adolescent development then should be revised to take into account these research findings of developmental psychologists. Her formulations can be expanded to include two new postulates. The first is to consider the evidence for ego and superego epigenesis at puberty and on this basis consider an autonomous ego and superego development in this stage of growth. And the second postulate to consider is to take more seriously the impact of current external reality, environment and interpersonal encounters, on the development of personality generally and the superego particularly in the adolescent phase. If the findings of developmental psychology are incorporated it may help understand the enigma of adolescence. To perceive psychosocial and psychosexual development in terms of new ego and superego capacities and their



reaction and response to new experience may assist in penetrating the mystery of accumulated data regarding this uncomfortable phenomenon. Anna Freud's theoretical formulations on adolescent ego and superego, determined by the experience of object relations in early childhood,<sup>13</sup> would be adjusted.

Her position in Ego and Mechanisms of Defense is that the threat from the overwhelming strength of the instinctual forces to the adolescent results in his resorting to a primary defense. When this troubled adolescent is seen in analysis she appraises the goodly amount of fear and anxiety the adolescent evidences as simply too great to be accounted for in terms of anxiety related to external reality or to the superego. The childhood deposits are not a sufficient basis for the anxiety over ripening sexual and aggressive forces in adolescence. Nowhere in her book does Anna Freud elaborate on the possible role of prohibitions in current life experience in adolescence. There is no analogy of such a possible role to the clearly expressed and conceptualized role of prohibitions in the ego and superego formations of early childhood. Perhaps if she had considered the importance of such a role the

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

implications drawn from such investigation would be that the ego and superego structures in adolescence do differ considerably from the ego and superego of the child. And the difference is not insignificant for it implicates the ego and the superego in their content, knowledge capacities, and future contributions to the adolescent.

#### INHELDER AND PIAGET

In the study published in English as The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence,<sup>14</sup> they summarize evidence secured from sixteen recent experiments. The chapter entitled, "Adolescent Thinking" contributes research evidence for an epigenetic development of ego and superego at the time of puberty and adolescence. Their work provides evidence for a characteristic cognitive development in adolescence which need not be conceptualized as related to defense mechanisms. Cognition is used by them to include understanding, conception and intellectual grasp. This cognitive structure which develops at

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<sup>14</sup>Barbel Inhelder and Jean Piaget, "Adolescent Thinking," in their The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence (New York: Basic Books, 1958), pp. 334-357. The authors state in the preface of this work that the experiments were independently designed and executed by Inhelder and her assistants, Piaget contributing the theoretical interpretation of them.

adolescence is related to the concepts of autonomous ego and superego development of the same period.

They describe a series of experiments which demonstrate an altered ability in adolescence to conceptualize and to generalize because of the appearance of formal reasoning. These new capacities of cognition are to the adolescent personality development a great boon. For they give the adolescent new equipment with which to think about himself and about his objective reality. This new cognitive capacity is such as to dispose him to think of the ideal and of the possible, to reason in terms of hypothetical entities and conditions. This new variable of the adolescent may effect the integration of his ego, superego and id. Particularly this is applicable in the light of the adolescent's upheaval, concurrent in the id, and in the pre-existing structure in the ego and superego. And it should affect his immediate reality experiences and consequently influence the quality of his psychological functioning.

In the chapter "Adolescent Thinking" they review the results of their experiments which have been designed to elucidate the mental operations of children and of adolescents in situations which impel them toward both thought and action, at the same time. Their experiments indicate

that from the standpoint of logical structure, the thinking of the adolescent differs radically from that of the child. They analyze these differences in terms of symbolic logic. These differences are summarized by describing the logic of the child as one of concrete operations which he carries out in groups, relations or numbers without integrating them into the single total system found in formal logic. In contrast to this style of logic, the adolescent evidences a different style. The adolescent super-imposes propositional logic on the logic of groups and relations.<sup>15</sup> A paradigm of how the adolescent thinks might be explained thus:

He begins by organizing the various elements of the raw data with the concrete-operational techniques of middle childhood. These organized elements are then cast in the form of statements or propositions which can be combined in various ways. Through the method of combinatorial analysis he then isolates for considerations the totality of distinct combinations of these propositions. These combinations are regarded as hypotheses, some of which will be confirmed and some infirmed by subsequent investigation. Is it true that A elicits X? If so, does B also? Is it true that A produces X only when B is absent? Such are the hypothetical questions which make up the domain of the possible in such problems; and the adolescent views his task as that of determining the actual shape of things by successively putting them to empirical test.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Inhelder, op. cit., p. 339.

<sup>16</sup>John H. Flavell, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963), p. 206.

Gradually the adolescent develops a formal operational mechanism functioning effectively at about 14 or 15 years of age, by which he comes to control "hypothetico-deductive" reasoning and experimental proof.

Acknowledging that there is more to thinking than logic, Inhelder and Piaget go on to claim that these logical transformations can account for the general modifications of thinking which seem to be typical of the adolescent. This structural transformation is like a center from which radiate the various more apparent modifications of thinking that take place in the stage of growth called adolescence.

These developmental psychologists postulate that the fundamental problem of adolescence is the ideal assumption of adult roles and responsibilities.<sup>17</sup> They contend that this social transition and passage into adulthood is more fundamental and of greater significance than the physiological transformations so evident at puberty. They acknowledge a number of links between the rise of formal operational structures in thinking and the transformations of affective life. However they believe that these relations are complex and that they are not one-way affairs.

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 338-39.

They claim that the transformations of thought and the assumption of adult roles and ideals involve the total restructuring of the personality, in which the intellectual transformations are parallel or complementary to the transformations of affect.

They suggest that while the appearance of the "hypothetico-deductive" attitude and other attributes of formal operational thought is not the direct consequence of puberty, both may be manifestations of cerebral transformations due to maturation of the nervous system.<sup>18</sup> The maturation of the nervous system can do no more than determine the total of possibilities and impossibilities at a given stage. Furthermore a particular social environment remains indispensable for the realization of these possibilities. Correspondingly the brain, if it is to be influenced by the social milieu, has to be in a state of readiness to assimilate its contributions.

They also indicate that the development of formal thought furthers the adolescent's capacity to learn adult roles and ideals. The adolescent's new found capacity to look beyond the immediate, concrete present enables him to think about his future, society's future and their

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<sup>18</sup>Inhelder, op. cit., p. 336.

interrelationship. They claim that:

The adolescent's theory construction shows both that he has become capable of reflective thinking and that his thought makes it possible for him to escape the concrete present toward the realm of the abstract and the possible. Obviously, this does not mean that formal structures are first organized by themselves and are later applied as adaptive instruments where they prove individually or socially useful. The two processes--structural development and everyday application--both belong to the same reality, and it is because formal thinking plays a fundamental role from the functional standpoint that it can attain its general and logical structure. Once more, logic is not isolated from life; it is no more than the expression of operational coordinations essential to action.<sup>19</sup>

The adolescent's newly developed formal structures form the cognitive basis for the assumption of adult ideals, adopting thereby representative values and ideals explicating a life style or Weltanschauung.

Like the child the adolescent lives in the present; unlike the child the adolescent lives also in the non-present, that is in the domain of the hypothetical, the possible, the future. The conceptual world of the adolescent is full of informal theories about abstract and esoteric political, religious and philosophical themes.<sup>20</sup> The adolescent, in short, is full of ideation which goes far beyond his immediate present situation and current social

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 341-42.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 343-44.

dealings. Although the precise content of this ideation does vary, of course, both within and between cultures, this should not obscure what Piaget feels to be an important common denominator: the child deals with the present; the adolescent extends his conceptual range to the spatially remote and the future. And for the adolescent the world of personally relevant future possibilities --occupational selection, marital choice, authentic ethical values--is the most important object of reflection. The adolescent will shortly become an adult and consequently he must make intellectual contact with social collectivities much less immediate than his family: city, church, and country. The assimilation of adult perspective and evaluations which delineate societies or social classes or ideological goals is now within reach for the adolescent because of the development of formal thought.

The development of formal thought structures and capacities liberate the adolescent from childhood and allow him to assume an equal place with adults. Piaget asserts that the adoption of adult roles and ideals is dependent upon effective and intellectual tools. The spontaneous development of just these tools in adolescence is what distinguishes it from childhood. His newly developed ability to abstract seems directly related to the capacities for



formal thought, including thinking about thought and reversing relations between what is real and what is possible. These tools are those which the adolescent uses to assume ideals, to adapt to society and to appreciate reality.

There is another tie between the activities of the adolescent and Piaget's theory of development that deserves mention. It involves his concept of egocentrism.<sup>21</sup> According to his observation there are three high-water marks of egocentrism: one in early infancy for the sensory motor field and one in the preschool years for the concrete-representational domain and the third and final one in adolescence. It occurs in adolescence as a consequence of the extension of reflective thought into the realm of the possible and the hypothetical. He suggests that this new egocentrism takes the form of a kind of naive or heroic idealism, bent on intemperate proposals for reforming and reshaping reality. This "omnipotence of thought" is characteristic of all egocentrism, but especially adolescent. And he can have an immoderate belief in the efficacy of his thought coupled with a cavalier disregard for the practical obstacles which may face his proposals. Piaget states:

The indefinite extension of powers of thought made possible by the new instruments of propositional logic

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 343 ff.

at first is conducive to a failure to distinguish between the ego's new and unpredicted capacities and the social or cosmic universe to which they are applied. In other words, the adolescent goes through a phase in which he attributes an unlimited power to his own thoughts so that the dream of a glorious future or of transforming the world through ideas (even if this idealism takes a materialistic form) seems to be not only fantasy but also an effective action which in itself modifies the empirical world. This is obviously a form of cognitive egocentrism. Although it differs sharply from the child's egocentrism. . . . it results, nevertheless, from the same mechanism and appears as a function of the new conditions created by the structuring of formal thought.<sup>22</sup>

The implications of Inhelder and Piaget's research constitute a significant addition to the understanding of adolescence. It also contributes to the existing material and theory regarding the ego and superego development and consolidation in the adolescent phase of growth. The new capacities in adolescence for cognitive formal thought described by Piaget are important determinants in personality development. And particularly aspects of personality development conceptualized from other data and from other perspectives.

Edith Jacobson postulates a psychic reorientation and restructuring of the ego and superego in the adolescent period. The result, she believes, is the consolidation and readjustment of these psychic agencies in the

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 345-46.

adolescent. Erik Erikson conceptualizes the psycho-social crisis of adolescence--the crisis of identity and ideals--with the accompanying proposition that new potentialities within the adolescent personality join with new expectation and response in the environment to bring issues of identity and ideals into prominence. The research findings of Inhelder and Piaget provide new evidence for the concept of the restructuring of ego and superego in the adolescent phase of development.

#### EDITH JACOBSON

In her creative essay, "Adolescent Moods and the Remodeling of Psychic Structure in Adolescence," Edith Jacobson gives an account of changes in ego and superego structures in adolescence.<sup>23</sup> She claims that for her the developmental problems of adolescence have not yet been fully explored. She begins her exploration by describing the mood shifts of adolescents. "One week he may be in a state of doleful sadness, of Weltschmerz and despair. The next week may be a period of earnest concentration and introspection. To-day we may enjoy his sparkling enthusiasm, his burning interest in his studies, of his infectious joyfulness and

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<sup>23</sup>Edith Jacobson, "Adolescent Moods and the Remodeling of Psychic Structure in Adolescence," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, XVI (1961), 164-165.

his high-spirited sociability. But tomorrow we may be angered by his boistrous activities or his foolhardy recklessness."<sup>24</sup> Such tremendous fluctuations in feelings and paradoxical moods baffle the observer when he asks what is the nature and origin of such moody fluctuations. Jacobson pictures the inner world of the adolescent struggling with inner and outer phase specific tasks.

. . . adolescence is life between a saddening farewell to childhood--i.e. to the self and the objects of the past--and a gradual, anxious-hopeful passing over many barriers to the gates which permit entrance to the still unknown country of adulthood. Beginning with his infantile love objects, the adolescent must not only free himself from persons who were all important during childhood, but renounce his former pleasures and pursuits more rapidly than at any former developmental stage. Preparing himself to leave home sooner or later, he must reach out for adult sex, love and responsibility, for personal and social relations of a new and different type, for new interests and sublimations, and last but not least, for new values, standards and goals which can offer him directions for his future and aid him in making the most important decisions of his life: in vocational choice which will determine his work and his future financial and social situation, and the choice of a love object--ultimately of a marital partner.<sup>25</sup>

These comprehensive tasks in adolescence, she postulates, necessitates a complete reorientation of the personality. This reorientation leads to structural and energetic transformations, to economic cathetic redistributions and to a drastic overhauling of the entire psychic organization.

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 164-65.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 165-66.

The tremendous psychobiological changes of puberty have been identified. These very changes cause emotional turmoil and instinctual conflicts which plunge the adolescent into confusion, anxiety, and a "return to infantile positions, followed by propulsion and reorganization at more advanced and more adult levels."<sup>26</sup> Turmoil and confusion can be observed at any developmental stage of growth. But in the adolescent period there is added the dramatic clash between progressive and regressive forces.

This clash leads to a far-reaching temporary dissolution of old structures and organizations, in conjunction with new structure formation and the establishment of new hierarchic orders, in which earlier psychic formations definitely assume a subordinate role, while new ones acquire and sustain dominance.<sup>27</sup>

In her account of the psychological changes in the adolescent, she describes the consequences of the pubertal instinctual assault on the ego. But she emphasizes also that there is a continuous growth and change in the ego itself. Consequently,

the ego is certainly bound to reinstate past positions before it can cope with the formidable task of finding new ways of instinctual control and new avenues of discharge, which can help the adolescent not only to relinquish his childhood attachments, but also to gain the optimal and socially permissible degree of instinctual and emotional freedom needed for the building of adult sexual and personal relationships.<sup>28</sup>

This latter emphasis is continued in her assertion that the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 166.      <sup>27</sup> Ibid.      <sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 166-67.

adolescent's struggle for maturity and final liberation from his family bonds is ". . . necessary for the final establishment of the autonomy and independence of his ego and superego."<sup>29</sup> This struggle for freedom is supported in puberty by the remarkable modification and formation of new structures in his superego and ego.

Her discussion on the process of readjustment and consolidation of the superego system in adolescence is complex.

"Since the superego is built up by virtue of partial identifications with idealized parental images, with parental standards, demands and prohibitions" any analysis of the superego system must include an analysis of the role of identification in the reorganization of the defenses.

And from the point of view of the ego, she also delineates the implications of maturation of ego functions for new modes of learning and adaptation to reality by direct and immediate contact.

But up to his adolescence . . . the child with a normal ego strength learns to adapt to society--and to reality in general--less by direct and immediate contact than through the medium of his relations and identifications with his parents and parental figures. To the extent to which his ego has matured and established its secondary autonomy, however, these identifications must lose an essential part of their function. Thus contradictions must arise between the adolescent's need to

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

cope with the loss of infantile love objects, by fortifying his identifications with them and the fact that these very identifications become more and more dispensable.<sup>30</sup>

She suggests that since the adolescent must give up his infantile love objects, one might infer that he would achieve this mainly by even stronger identifications with them in the superego. Not so, she claims. Because the ego has matured and established its secondary autonomy, it adapts to reality more by direct and immediate contact and less through identifications with parents. This new direction and capacity of the ego appears implicitly related to the new cognitive capacities described in Inhelder and Piaget's research findings.

Jacobson's discussion of the new relation to reality which the new ego capacities make possible indicates the high significance of current reality relationships. These relationships relate directly to the restructuring and consolidation of the ego and superego by "direct and immediate contact and by identification." She stresses that unless these new psychic formations connect essentially to those of the past, remodeling and reorganization of the superego and the development and integration of the new ego cannot occur.

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 168-69.

The processes of new structure formation and reorganization during adolescence are successful only as long as they do not deplete the libidinous investments or eradicate the identifications of the past. They merely reduce and displace them to new attachments and partly to new identifications. Putting it from the structural angle: the superego cannot be remodeled, reorganized and consolidated; new personal and sexual relations, new ego structures and ego functions cannot be built up and integrated unless these new formations are allowed to grow organically from those of the past.<sup>31</sup>

From the viewpoint of the superego, its goals and functions also undergo remarkable changes comparing it to the Oedipal period. During the Oedipal period of superego formation the child normally resolves his Oedipal conflicts with the aid of defenses which allow him to repress and inhibit his instinctual forbidden wishes. These taboo wishes are repressed to the point of renouncing sexual activities in general. In adolescence it is more complicated. The superego must once more enforce the taboo on incest, yet at the same time the superego must "open the barriers of repression and lift the burden of counterathemes sufficiently to guide the adolescent on his road to the sexual freedom of the adult and to mature personal and love relationships."<sup>32</sup> In her subsequent discussion of the vicissitudes of superego identifications, she describes in detail the changes involved in establishing identification with

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<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 169.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.



parents as sexually active persons who will grant the adolescent too, the right of sexuality and other prerogatives of maturity.

The most incisive and difficult step is the gradual establishment of enduring identifications with his parents as sexually active persons, who will ultimately grant him too, the rights of indulgence. . . .<sup>33</sup>

Such identification with the sexually active parental figures is possible only to the extent to which the ego and superego mature, become reconstructed and consolidated, reaching new levels of strength and integration. In childhood these identifications were unacceptable; now they must become not only ego syntonic but dominant. These new identifications which permit a new sexual freedom "become only gradually an integral part of the adolescent's ever-widening identifications with the grown-ups." And this generalizing of identifications is into all the areas of the ego development under the influence and guidance of the new or modified superego identifications.

As a result of these new identifications in adolescence the moral codes of the superego must undergo changes. She states simply and briefly these changes, first in childhood and then in adolescence.

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 170.

. . . In childhood the superego stated: "If you identify with the parental demands and prohibitions, you will be granted sexual pleasure in the adult future," it must now [in adolescence] convey: "You are permitted to enjoy adult sexual and emotional freedom to the extent to which you renounce your infantile instinctual desires, loosen your childhood attachments, and accept adult ethical standards and responsibilities."<sup>34</sup>

In short, the adolescent must modify and tone down the images he holds of the idealized sexually prohibiting parents. He must reconcile these images with external reality and concepts, of sexually active parents. And simultaneously the adolescent must build up new sets of values and goals based on a firm re-establishment of the taboo on incest and parricide. The adolescent must become post-Oedipal if he is to become post-adolescent.

She further contributes that she connects directly the modification of the internal prohibiting images with significant modification and changes in the content of the superego functions and in the ego ideal function, as a part of the superego. These modifications result not only from identification processes but also from new structure formations in the maturing ego. However these processes of change temporarily weaken the psychic system and the two agencies. For a change in the superego and ego

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<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

involves a reconciliation of the most opposing goals and aims and of very contradictory identifications. Those adolescents who fail at the reconciliation of these contradictions are the casualties--the disturbed ones whose concepts of becoming adult fluctuate between the fantasy that being adult means complete instinctual freedom and the idea that it means complete instinctual renunciation. The process of resolution causes upset. For shorter or longer periods, the process of resolving these contradictions causes marked fluctuations in superego functions and in the adolescent's behavior. These superego fluctuations cause upset in the adolescent's relationship to parents and to object relations in general. His behavior will alternate radically between two extremes of complete instinctual freedom and complete instinctual renunciation.

Struggling for a partial lifting of his repressions, the adolescent will suffer from severe sexual, narcissistic and ambivalence conflicts which will become manifest in his attitude toward persons of the same sex as well as the opposite sex. During this struggle, his ego will experience increased id and superego pressures and may alternately yield to the latter or rebel actively against it, and in overthrowing it join forces with the id. More or less stormy periods of sexual and aggressive acting out and of narcissistic inflation, thus may alternate with periods of repentance, of ascetic ideals, of strictly abstinent, moral behavior, and often of guilt, shame and inferiority feelings.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 171.

The radical vacillations and acting out during this struggle is unique because of the transitory collapse of the superego and the repressive barriers. This partial functional collapse of the superego results in regressive or primitive defenses of denial, introjection and projection to come into play against these overpowerful instinctual strivings.

Trying to ward them off, the adolescent may resort to aggression or flee from genital to pregenital goals or from "heterosexual to narcissistic-homosexual attachments" and activities and back again. By these regressive tactics the adolescent may escape from objects his own age to older or even incestuous objects.

She indicates that it is at this point the adolescent calls for help, in one way or another. His struggles against the instinctual forces and the struggle he is exposed to in reconciling the opposite goals of his early superego and id, prompts him to seek outside support and assistance. Help may come from extraneous people who at this phase of adolescent development lend themselves better than the parents do to repersonification and rejections of both the superego and the id. Even a pastor may be used. Or the adolescent may find assistance from the religious community which allows the same projections. Once more

Jacobson pictures the radical fluctuations between id and superego models that attract the adolescent's unconscious conflicts into open projection.

Pure and saintly or seductive and ruthless men or women may thus alternately become admired and emulated or despised and hated, because they represent his own sexual temptations and ambitions or the virtue, humility and chastity he seeks. . . . the adolescents heroes or heroines may catch his eye because of their physical strength or attractiveness, or because of their sexual successes or their social glamour, their wealth, their ruthless career, and prominence in the fields of sport or art or science, of business or finance or politics, or even of crime. Moreover, his admiration for such persons and groups, or for the values they represent, may find expression in transient but intense homosexual or heterosexual "crushes," which frequently show a rather sadomasochistic coloring.<sup>36</sup>

This overconcern of the adolescent for such pleasures and interests as these persons and groups represent, serve narcissistic and instinctual goals rather than truly object-directed ones or aims of the superego. Such involvements indicate that the relationship between the superego and the ego have become "temporarily deneutralized and re-externalized."<sup>37</sup> It also indicates to Jacobson that the ego ideal, a superego function, may be temporarily and partially replaced with pseudo-idealized, glamorous, wishful images of self and objects. And the fantasies and daydreams of adolescents are filled with such pseudo-idealized images. She claims that they represent the

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 172-73.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

adolescent's expanding, narcissistic, ego-centric, sexual and aggressive strivings. Even though these images, interests and goals strike the adult as being superficial or even dangerous, she believes that such "worldly ambitions actually has a most stimulating effect on the ego development and normally results in a gradual modification of the superego."<sup>38</sup>

The modification of the superego according to Jacobson enhances the position of the ego in turn. This comes about in relation to his self-esteem. According to her the adolescent's overconcern with the values of these new interests and goals enlarges his personal self-esteem, because it is extended from the moral sphere of the functioning superego to all fields of physical, sexual, intellectual and social accomplishments. But on the other side of the ledger is the adolescent's feelings of inferiority, shame and guilt. Such high fluctuations of personal self-esteem are seen originating from two sources. The first vacillation cause originates in the moral conflicts issuing out of ego superego tensions. And secondly, there comes into focus the tension between the ego ideal and the ego. And the tensions are severe. For example the tension

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<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

between the adolescent's ideal of the adult--the powerful, brilliant and sophisticated person he wants to be and what he really is, a "physically and morally immature, half-baked creature between two worlds."<sup>39</sup>

Characteristically, the adolescent preoccupied with highly valued "worldly" aims and pleasures, simultaneously becomes deeply involved in serious intellectual and ethical problems. The rapid psychophysiological changes along with concomitant cognitive (formal thought) development permits this new activity. The effort to establish one's own intrinsic values and ethical constructs lead into a search for an overview of life, what the Germans and Freud label as a *Weltanschauung*.

A *Weltanschauung* includes and generates ideals and ethical values commensurate with the style of life it proposes. Through the development of formal thought and perception it extends itself through these ideals, influencing opinions from culture to nature, on sex, race, nation and religion. The adolescent, because of his newly developed capacities and needs, is encouraged in this direction, which at times becomes more than juvenile.

We examine the diaries and jottings of adolescents, and we are not only amazed at the wide and unfettered sweep

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<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 174.

of their thought but impressed by the degree of empathy and understanding manifested by their apparent superiority to more mature thinkers and sometimes even by the wisdom which they display in their handling of the most difficult problems.<sup>40</sup>

The evolution and final adoption of a personal world view however must connect essentially with those identifications which helped him build up new sets of values and goals. Able to enter into the domain of the hypothetical, the<sup>41</sup> adolescent, in using his freedom of thought, causes a dual effect in the remodeling of his psychic system.

On the one hand it [freedom of thought] supports the ultimate integration and consolidation of those superego and ego identifications which curtail and limit the liberties gained in the course of adolescence. On the other hand it achieves an even further reduction of the role of identifications as such, inasmuch as it favors and reflects the adolescent's final establishment of ego and superego autonomy, which eventually brings about an increasing degree of freedom not only from external (parental and other personal and social) influences, but likewise from outmoded internal (instinctual as well as superego) pressures.<sup>42</sup>

Threatened by overpowering instinctual forces, the adolescent experiences the need for order, guidance and orientation found in an authentic ideological overview or Weltanschauung. One inescapable inner demand is for ideological polarization in this period of growth. The

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<sup>40</sup>A. Freud, Ego and Mechanisms of Defense, p. 175.

<sup>41</sup>Flavell, op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>42</sup>Jacobson, op. cit., p. 175.



term ideology is used because it is defined as,

an unconscious tendency underlying religious and scientific as well as political thought: the tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity.<sup>43</sup>

### ERIK ERIKSON

His clinical case studies present pertinent evidence for the claim of ego and superego epigenesis at puberty, in addition to the appreciation of the influence and impact of current psychosocial reality on adolescent personality development. The psychosexual irritation pushing the adolescent away from early dependencies and the psychosocial pull of his need to be his own man draws him toward the future. These pushes and pulls are conceptualized in Erikson's theory outlining the sequence of phases of psychological development.

This sequence of the phases of psychosocial development parallels that of libido development and goes beyond it, spanning the whole life cycle . . . Each phase of the life cycle is characterized by a phase-specific developmental task which must be solved in it, though this solution is prepared in the previous phases and is worked out further in subsequent ones. . . . This theory particularizes Hartmann's theory of reality relations, in that it deals with the ego aspect and the social aspect of object relations. It conceives of the

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<sup>43</sup>Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 22.

caretaking persons as representatives of their society, as carriers of its institutional, traditional, caretaking patterns, and thus it focuses attention on the fact that each society meets each phase of the development of its members by institutions (parental care, school, teachers, occupations, etc.) specific to it, to ensure that the developing individual will be viable in it. The theory conceives of the sequence of epigenetic phases as universal, and of the typical solutions as varying from society to society.<sup>44</sup>

The epigenetic phase-specific task which concerns us regarding adolescent development at this point is what Erikson calls the struggle for ideological polarization. This search for perspective is conceptualized in Erikson's superego psychology as an ideological one. He agrees that the word "ideology" is open to criticism.

The very word "ideology" itself has somewhat of a bad name. By their very nature ideologies contradict other ideologies as "inconsistent" and hypocritical; and an over-all critique of ideology characterizes its persuasive simplifications as a systematic form of collective hypocrisy. For it is true that the average adult, and in fact, the average community, if not acutely engaged in some ideological polarization, are apt to consign ideology to a well-circumscribed compartment in their lives, where it remains handy for periodical rituals and rationalizations, but will do no harm to other business at hand. Yet, the fact that ideologies are simplified conceptions of what is to come (and thus later can serve as rationalizations for what has come about) does not preclude the possibility that at certain periods in history, ideological polarization, conflict and commitment correspond to an inescapable inner need. Youth needs to base its rejections and acceptances on ideological alternative vitally

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<sup>44</sup>Erik Erikson, "Identity and the Life Cycle," Psychological Issues, I, 1, monograph 1 (1959), 14-15.

related to the existing range of alternatives for identity formation.<sup>45</sup>

The inescapable inner need for ideological polarization connects directly to the inescapable search for inner coherence and unity. Integration and personal synthesis of the personality in the adolescent phase occurs under the influence of authentic ideals, goals and ideological perspective. Adolescents do not want to be determined by what went on before in history; it may determine his own future and what draws him towards his own personal fulfillment. If the adolescent feels that he is so determined then he feels limited to the identities and values of childhood. So determined he would feel limited socially because invested interests could determine then a group's historical perspective and future.

Historical perspective in the adolescent period has a basis for development because of the growth of the new capacity for formal thought. This new capacity investigated by Inhelder and Piaget, allows not only for the adolescent's imaginative speculation about all that could have gone on in the past but also for a "deeping concern with the narrowing down of vast possibilities to a few alternatives, often resolved only by a 'totalistic' search for single

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 157-58.

causes."<sup>46</sup> Erikson contends that youth is

preoccupied with the danger of hopeless determination, be it by irreversible childhood identifications, by ineradicable secret sins or socially "stacked" conditions, and with the question of freedom in many urgent forms. Where a sense of fatal determination prevails, the quest for its causes becomes an ideological one.

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The search in adolescence for ideological perspective and confirmation is prepared for by his new cognitive readiness and affective need. The integrating influence of an ideological perspective is conceptualized within the psychosocial pull of reality. Being a time of crucial realignment not only the adolescent psychic structure is involved but also his relationship to social reality. The point of contact between the two is the growing capacities of the superego and ego. Erikson has given case evidence for this new capacity growth in the study Young Man Luther. In this particular work, complex issues of the integration of social reality with the adolescent's history and new genetic capacities are conceptualized. The phrase, "the crisis of identity and ideals" is a construct uniting these psychosexual and psychosocial tensions. The phase specific task of this period is the solidification of the ego ideal

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<sup>46</sup>Erik Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 171.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid.

and conscience with the ego in personal identity.

### EGO IDEAL

Before the capacity and content of the ego ideal is considered, the pestiferous question of its "place" in the psychic makeup of the individual must be raised. Is the ego ideal rather a separate, autonomous psychic system or is it properly a function of the superego or of the ego? The question is important in lieu of our discussion of the exigencies of ideology and ideals in the adolescent's search for inner coherence and meaning.

Historically, in Freud's writings, there was a time when he considered the terms "ego ideal" and "superego" synonymous,<sup>48</sup> using them interchangeably. Ego ideal was used in the sense of the superego's function to maintain and enforce standards on the ego. In "New Introductory Lectures" Freud mentions ego ideal, the holding up of ideals, as a function of the superego.

One more important function remains to be mentioned which we attribute to this super-ego. It is also the vehicle of the ego ideal by which the ego measures itself, which it emulates, and whose demand for ever greater perfection it strives to fulfill.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup>Supra, p. 39.

<sup>49</sup>S. Freud, op. cit., XXII, 64-65.

It seems clear that Freud at that time at least, conceived of the superego system as an agency among whose functions or activities was the ego ideal. He saw the superego moral prohibitions closely related to the strivings toward "ideals." Functioning together they are what "we have been able to grasp psychologically of what is described as the higher side of human life."<sup>50</sup>

Two recent papers on the "place" of the ego ideal mention also some of the factors which effect ego ideal development. One essay describes the ego ideal precursors in childhood that participate in determining the kind of superego standards which are internalized. "The ego ideal can be considered to arise from three main sources: the idealization of the parents; the idealization of the child by the parents; and the idealization of the self by the child. . . . Such an ego ideal can influence the superego formation by increasing the child's capacity to recognize and follow the limits of socially acceptable behavior."<sup>51</sup>

It has been postulated that it is in the adolescent

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., XXII, 67.

<sup>51</sup>Samuel Ritvo and Albert Solnit, "The Relationship of Early Ego Identifications to Superego Formation," International Journal of Psychoanalysis XLI (1960), 299.

developmental phase<sup>52</sup> that the ideal aims and directions of the ego ideal as well as the moral prohibitions of the superego are modified and restructured. These superego functions (ideal and critical) become integrated during this phase and assume under the organizing influence of the ego, the central position in what has been called a person's ethical or moral system. And this in turn is essentially connected to a person's ideology or Weltanschauung.

As these functions come to be integrated in adolescence, to act according to a ethical system or standard of ideals comes to mean according to Freud, not only reduction of

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<sup>52</sup>The incapacity to recognize and follow socially acceptable behavior is one diagnostic description of the juvenile delinquent. August Aichhorn in his classic book, Wayward Youth, states his pertinent remedy. "What helps the worker most in therapy with the dissocial? The transference! And especially what we recognize as the positive transference. It is above all the tender feeling for the teacher that gives the pupil the incentive to do what is prescribed and not to do what is forbidden. The teacher, as a libidinally charged object for the pupil, offers traits for identification that bring about a lasting change in the structure of the ego ideal. . . . We must succeed as in psychoanalysis, in bringing the wayward youth under the influence of the transference to a definite achievement. This achievement consists in a real character change, in the setting up of a socially directed ego ideal: that is in the retrieving of that part of his development which is necessary for a proper adjustment to society." August Aichhorn, Wayward Youth (New York: Noonday Press, 1955), pp. 180-181.

guilt feelings but also narcissistic gratification. "If the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something which would be objectionable to the superego, it feels raised in its self-esteem and strengthened in its pride."<sup>53</sup>

With the ego ideal integrated in adolescence with the other elements of the superego, the net result is the strengthening of its demands.<sup>54</sup> The superego "ought nots" lend their powerful sources of energy to the positive aims and contents of the ego ideal. And the ego ideal contains many values--ideals of morality, justice, courage, wisdom and love. According to Hartmann "the great systems of moral thought which humanity has developed very often show the ego ideal aspect and the aspect of the moral restrictions side by side; as the 'good' on the one hand, and the 'ought not' on the other."<sup>55</sup>

The genetic continuity between the ego ideal in childhood and the developed ego ideal in adolescence which integrates with the other aspects or functions of the superego,

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<sup>53</sup>S. Freud, op. cit., XXIII, 206.

<sup>54</sup>Heinz Hartmann and Rudolph Loewenstein, "Notes on the Superego," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, XVII (1962), 63.

<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 63.



contributes according to Hartmann, something new.

There is in the development of the ego ideal "something new," something very important, which we may well describe as or attribute to a "change of function," a term used in describing ego development. As we said, what is added is that the "striving after perfection" of the ego ideal becomes dynamically a partly independent direction-giving function, which is relatively independent from the objects and relatively independent also from the instinctual precursors. The aims of the ego ideal are then to a considerable extent no longer identical with the primitive wishes which played a role in its formation.<sup>56</sup>

The growing modification and autonomy of the ego ideal as a function of the superego occurs during the growth and change of adolescence. And the integration of the different aspects of the superego along with the integration of this restructured superego with an ideology and value system is a phase-specific task of the adolescent in growth. What he takes as his ego ideal models and values--ethical system--influence the superego strongly, assisting in its restructuring.

Every moral value system . . . represents . . . the ideal demands or directions of the ego ideal, and the "ought nots" of the prohibiting aspects of the superego; the two aspects . . . are closely interrelated. These processes and interactions are usually partly conscious, though many important elements are not. At any rate, on the way from the early idealizations and the internalizations of parental prohibitions to the moral codes of the adult a factor becomes relevant . . . a process of integration and generalization.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 64.      <sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 78-79.

### NEW IDENTIFICATIONS

New patterns of ideals are chosen during adolescent development. The choices are not always sudden, for the adolescent has identified with many models, depending on the fluctuations in feelings and paradoxical moods, so picturesquely described by Jacobson. The new role of identification, consequently, gains strength in adolescence. Identifications become more compelling and the need for support from outside is greater. Just what does this identification mean?

Not all analysts assign exactly the same meaning to the term identification; and . . . there are certainly different kinds of identification. Some questions as to its metapsychology are under discussion. But we all agree that the result of identification is that the identifying person behaves in some way like the person with whom he has identified himself. The likeness may refer to the characteristics, features, reality (or to the role it plays in reality according to the fantasy of the person who makes the identification); it may mean to "take the place" of the other person. Freud (1921) describes it also as "moulding oneself" after the fashion of the object that has been taken as a model. We use the term both for the process and the result.<sup>58</sup>

The adolescent has an "inescapable inner need" for ideals and ego ideal models. This need requiring fulfillment through authentic models and ideals, if not available may lead to a dangerous situation for the adolescent.

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid., pp. 48-49.

This danger is most threatening where the bonds of a society are chiefly constituted by the identification of its members with one another, while individuals of the leader type do not acquire the importance that should fall to them. . . . The present cultural state of America would give us a good opportunity for studying the damage to civilization which is thus to be feared.<sup>59</sup>

Freud was apprehensive about what he saw in America toward mass conformity. It is true that any culture, including our own, which does not offer "leading personalities," and heroic figures will be unable normally to meet the need for adolescent ego ideal models. His hunger for what is not readily available may drive him to abnormal dependence on his peers as a substitute. His peer group can represent a social organization that takes care of the instinctual, functional and value disturbances of the adolescent in a conveniently institutionalized way. An overevaluation of the peer group can indicate a distinct lack of primary models of identification and ideals. Normally, however, the peer group helps maintain in the participating adolescent, his self esteem and healthy narcissistic equilibrium. Peer group friends take on special meaning; they may come to act as an auxiliary superego or ego. And an auxiliary superego can become an important source of approval and well-being.

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<sup>59</sup>S. Freud, op. cit., XXI, 115-16.

On the other hand, the adolescent may be confronted with the fact that his ego ideal is different from what is presented and valued by his contemporaries. And their expectations may be experienced as further superego demands. In such a bind, the adolescent may withdraw from these demands, either regressing to more infantile ways of narcissistic satisfaction or trying in every which way to adopt new external ideals. The advocacy of these new external ideals serves, in this case, as a defense against anxiety aroused by the awareness of inner insufficiency. In such maneuvers these external ideals are not established inner signs of maturity.

Pseudo ego ideals are one thing. Authentic ego ideals of a non-defensive sort supported by expectations of peers, is another. The ego ideal with such external support can assist the adolescent in healthy solution to some of his problems. An English clinician, Laufer, illustrates the role of the ego ideal in assisting the adolescent solve two thorny instinctual problems: finding a new love object and masturbation. With his ripening genital primacy, the adolescent is pushed into escaping his dependent status on his parents and finding new non-incestuous love objects.

Laufer reviews Freud's essay "On Narcissism" where Freud lists what he sees as the path leading to the choice of a love object. Freud states: a person may love--

- (1) according to the narcissistic type:
  - (a) what he himself is (i.e. himself)
  - (b) what he himself was
  - (c) what he himself would like to be
  - (d) someone who was once part of himself, or
- (2) according to the anaclitic (attachment) type:
  - (a) the woman who feeds him
  - (b) the man who protects him, and the succession of substitutes who take their place.<sup>60</sup>

Laufer takes Freud's remarks and applies them to what takes place in adolescence. The choice of a new love object must answer a number of inner demands and expectations. The determining factors to such an object choice are, according to Laufer, related to:

- (a) what he actually is (the image of himself)
- (b) what he would like to be (present ego ideal)
- (c) what he ought to be (conscience)
- (d) what he must not be (self-criticism) [negative identity]<sup>61</sup>

Prior to adolescence his identifications were used for "structure building and for the purpose of defense,"<sup>62</sup> and the means of resolving the Oedipal conflict. Once puberty

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<sup>60</sup>Ibid., XIV, 90.

<sup>61</sup>M. Laufer, "Ego Ideal and Pseudo Ego Ideal in Adolescence," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, XIX (1964), 205.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid.

is upon him, genitality makes new and additional demands. And the old identifications, inadequate to help the adolescent assume his proper sexual role, conflict with what he must be, with what he would like to be and with what he ought to be. In short he is to be not only male, but sexual and loving.

Adults who have worked in any depth with adolescents sense their longing for a direct and meaningful encounter with another person but who, on the other hand, are unable to allow such a mutual encounter to take place. Laufer postulates that these adolescents are unconsciously aware of their wish for a relationship on an earlier level. This is not how it should be. It also conflicts with the expectations set up by their contemporaries. Laufer cites as an example, a clinical incident with a passive adolescent who describes his wish for and inability to date a girl. The boy's comment was: "My friends talk of going out with girls. I like hearing it, but it worries me. I want to be like them, but I just know that I can't. Maybe it would be easier to be the girl."<sup>63</sup>

Another problem current in adolescence related to the ego ideal is masturbation. The prohibition against

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

masturbation by the superego is as strong as ever, but in addition, the earlier masturbation conflict is now experienced within the context of mature physical genitality. Laufer believes that these "identifications may be used in an attempt to alter the content of the ego ideal to rid it of all but the fantasied perfect figures, free of sexual demands."<sup>64</sup> If this defensive maneuver is successful, he becomes what is called the "ascetic adolescent."<sup>65</sup> And the inauthentic ideal he now seeks to attain represents complete control over instinctual demands. Consciously these desires become non-existent. If early defensive maneuvers are not resorted to, then the sexual conflict is out in the open. Another clinical example cited by Laufer includes the comments by the seventeen year old patient describing his inner tensions.

"When I think of older women I like it and it also frightens me. It disgusts me, and yet I go on thinking about them, but only when I masturbate." In describing his reaction after masturbation, he said, "At the time I feel as if I'm crazy or something, but when I come back to normal I just feel ashamed."<sup>66</sup>

The shame and guilt this adolescent indicates relates to his direct incestuous fantasy desires. It is also a reaction to behaving in a way which is contrary to the

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<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 208.      <sup>65</sup>Supra, p. 91.

<sup>66</sup>Laufer, op. cit., p. 209.

picture of himself which he wishes to uphold. He feels that he has let himself down, permitting into consciousness a part of himself which represents a regression.

When the adolescent struggles to maintain the image or ideal which he is striving to acquire, regression is an enemy. Dependence on original love objects is taboo. "The present ego ideal can now become a critic of the ego and temporarily act as a full superego equivalent."<sup>67</sup>

The authentic ego ideal is more closely related to social reality and contains attributes and goals which are attainable. This ego ideal plays a vital role in contributing to the well being and growth of the adolescent. It assists him in freeing himself from the original sources of narcissistic and Oedipal attachments and aids him in meeting the realistic demands of his peers.

The ego ideal is considered to be one of the functions of the superego. It should be viewed in content and aim in relation to the other two superego functions, self-criticism and conscience. If the second function of the superego, the ego ideal does its proper work it will attempt to reestablish identification with the parents as sexually active

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



and permissive people encouraging his ideal of the right to sexuality and ideological commitment. It will then be making its appointed contribution to the maturation and the assumption of realistic goals in this phase of human development.

From the genetic and functional points of view the idea of separating the ego ideal from the other functions of the superego is unacceptable. The ego ideal belongs with the critical, prohibiting superego as well as with the conscience. They together represent a functional unit, arising and maturing in diversity and unity. The ego ideal can not be disconnected from the more personal conscious value concepts and ideals which are increasingly built up during adolescence and after. As each function matures and does its appointed task it contributes to the integration of the entire adolescent personality.

Perhaps from a constricted ego viewpoint, the ego ideal with its ideals, heroes and goals may appear at times to be unreal. Their inner reality and place is inescapable. They often inspire man to performances which even the ego with its regard for equilibrium would pronounce idealistically unreal.

The place and changing content of this fascinating

construct, is caused by the modified role of identification and the development of formal thought processes, which contributes to the integration of the superego system and thus to the integration of the personality. The modification of the ego ideal proceeds only in conjunction with the modification of the entire superego system and its functions. And this maturation correlates with the growth of the ego. The ego ideal contributes to the integration of these two agencies, the superego and ego. It bridges them and through their mutual interaction gradually may be claimed by both. These last stages in the development of the ego ideal demonstrate beautifully the hierarchic reorganization occurring in the adolescent period and the final integration of different--earlier and later--value concepts into a new structural and functional unity. The evolution of the ego ideal as a coherent bridge structure connecting and belonging to both systems<sup>68</sup> eventually brings about a smoother collaboration between the critical superego and the ego. Subsequently, under the influence of its adjunct the ego, the superego's operational methods become enriched and endued with a new variability and flexibility. These new personal features are lacking in the critical infantile superego explored by Freud.

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<sup>68</sup>Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 178-79.

Inhelder and Piaget's research findings regarding the new cognitive capacity in adolescence is detailed and valid enough to warrant the assumption of Jacobson's reconstructed superego and ego as one of the maturational events of this phase of growth. The remodeling of psychic structures increasing the autonomy of the ego and superego in the adolescent is provided another empirical base because of Piaget's work. And the secondary autonomy of the superego and ego in adolescence provides a rationale for the relevance and influence of social reality on the developing personality. This assumption implies growth in the adolescent's ego to conceptualize and growth in the superego's capacity to integrate, especially through the formation of the modified ego ideal and conscience. These above suggestions and considerations postulate significant variables for another viewpoint on adolescent development and theory, freed from a total dependence on infantile patterns of superego development.

**CHAPTER THREE:**  
**RELIGION AND CONSCIENCE**

THE HISTORICAL "CASE": YOUNG LUTHER

The break with dependency on infantile patterns of the superego to an autonomous positive conscience in late adolescence is found in Erik Erikson's highly imaginative and creative study, Young Man Luther. Erikson chooses to look at ideology and ideals from the perspective of psychoanalysis and history. History is an aspect of personality theory, far from negligible, which fascinates Erikson the psychotherapist.

Let me restate the psychotherapeutic encounter then, as an historical one. A person has declared an emergency and has surrendered his self-regulation to a treatment procedure. Besides having become a subject patient, he has accepted the role of a formal client. To some degree, he has had to interrupt his autonomous life-history as lived in the unself-conscious balances of his private and his public life in order, for a while, to "favor" a part-aspect of himself and to observe it with the diagnostic help of a curative method: as he is "under observation," he becomes self-observant. As a patient he is inclined, and as a client encouraged, to historicize his own position by thinking back to the onset of the disturbance, and to ponder what world order (magic, scientific, ethical) was violated and must be restored, before his "normal" place in history can be resumed.<sup>1</sup>

Young Luther's "world order" was restored, according to Erikson by a timely relationship between him and his monastic superior, Dr. Staupitz. This venerable abbot of the Augustinian order became young Luther's father confessor,

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<sup>1</sup>Erik Erikson, Insight and Responsibility (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 54.

his spiritual mentor. "This Dr. Staupitz . . . was the best father figure Luther ever encountered and acknowledged; he was a man who recognized a true homo religiosus in his subaltern and treated him with therapeutic wisdom."<sup>2</sup> Staupitz heard young Luther's obsessively meticulous confessions and disarmed this compulsive monk with his humorous remarks. He understood young Luther's needs, let him talk, refused to argue with him, put him to work and made him study, preach and lecture. Staupitz, father in God, was the right man with the right words at the right time. With therapeutic courage he sponsored young Luther's second birth. According to Erikson this search for a second birth, a new reality, is a normal part of the adolescent struggle. For adolescence is an age which can be most painfully aware of the need for new decisions, driven to choose new ideals and to discard old outmoded ones. Seeking a new reality, a second birth, the adolescent can and does choose "new ancestors and his genuine contemporaries."<sup>3</sup> Staupitz became Luther's surrogate father, guarantor of his burgeoning new self.

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<sup>2</sup>Erik Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: Norton, 1958), p. 37.

<sup>3</sup>Erik Erikson, in "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," Daedalus xcl, 1, (Winter 1962), 15.

Staupitz, good sponsor and therapist that he was, did not keep young Luther for himself. He faced him forward, told Martin to "stop doubting and start looking, use his senses and judgment, grasp Christ as a male person like himself and identify with the man in God's son instead of being terrorized by a name, an image, a halo,"<sup>4</sup> and to look at him like a man. The vehicle of young Luther's new identity as a homo religiosus was to be the man Jesus. Jesus was to become Luther's ego ideal. He identified with this man<sup>5</sup> of Nazareth and through him to a way of life, a world view or perspective intrinsic to the life style revealed by him.

Staupitz pushed young Luther to study the original scriptural sources and there to encounter the "proper man." Young Luther found in Jesus an object of identification,<sup>6</sup> a hero. And he discovered in the biblical account what characteristics made Him a singular man, a hero. Young Luther in identifying with this model man found in Him the one characteristic critically relevant to a young man in the throes of identity and ideological crisis. That key

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<sup>4</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 168.

<sup>5</sup>Supra, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup>Supra, p. 30 and "identification," p. 128.

characteristic was freedom. The positive character of His personal freedom was compelling. He spoke and acted with the authority of a singular freedom. He was free, free to teach--"I say to you"--free to forgive, and above all free for his neighbor. This singular man was free from anxiety and free from the need to establish His own identity. But above all, it was His freedom to be compassionate for His neighbor, whatever that neighbor might be, without regard to Himself. This is the characteristic which the martyred Bonhoeffer in his last prison writings, also found so impressive, summarized in his phrase, "the man for others." Scriptural sources reveal the impress of this characteristic with its frequent references to this singular man's openness to all whom he met, his willingness to associate with those whose company was avoided by respectable people. In Mark 10:42-44 he was reported to have taught that the greatness of freedom lies in service, and His own freedom was characterized by humble service to others. This remarkably liberated man lived thus and he was put to death for being this kind of man in the midst of anxious, fearful and defensive men.

The accounts in scripture constantly refer to this man's personal authority, His freedom from claims made upon Him by parents and friends. He seemed to have been so free



of any need for status that he was able to resist all attempts by others to convey status on him. The evangelists in telling the story of this man Jesus told it as the story of a singularly free man who had set them free. This was the story they proclaimed as the gospel for all men. Down through history the story of this man has been retold and millions of people including young Luther were attracted and called by faith in this Christ. This means that he who says "Jesus is Lord," says that his freedom has been contagious and therefore Jesus' freedom has become the criterion for his life, public and private.<sup>7</sup> Consequently the role of the "Christian" is simply to be a man, as this is defined by Jesus of Nazareth.

The people who have responded down through history are called the church; they have in common this historical perspective--a perspective based on the free man who has set them free, who shared in this freedom and were aware of its source. And the mission of this people, the church, consisted in freely co-operating with God's mission to the world in Jesus as Christ.<sup>8</sup> In the name of this "divine

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<sup>7</sup>Martin Luther, "A Treatise on Christian Liberty," in his Three Treatises (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1943), pp. 249 ff.

<sup>8</sup>Paul Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of The Gospel (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 137 ff.

mission" the church claimed the world for Christ. But as the centuries passed the known world and the church became co-extensive. Then during the medieval period, this co-extension led to a confusion which was exemplified in the rise of the power of the papacy over that of the emperor. Consequently the world came to be claimed for the church rather than for Christ. It was against this distortion that young Luther rebelled and the Reformation commenced. He found his appointed task and historical role.

#### RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

Ross Snyder, a church educator, in describing the adolescent's struggle for ideological polarization states:

An ideology speaks to the need of all young people to find a bit of the world still to be made--where they have a chance to help shape things according to the vision in their mind. It offers a possible outlet for their rebellion against the stupidities of present adults. But also calls for a new vividness in their personal center--they are no longer like the other conforming, phony mediocrities. They are now real and of the future.<sup>9</sup>

Young Luther in identification with a particular, historical individual committed himself to the claim that this Jesus of Nazareth had universal significance. Acquiring through this ideal a new perspective of himself and the

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<sup>9</sup>Ross Snyder, "A Basis for the Educational Work of the Church," (mimeographed).

whole of life, he was embraced by a historical ideology. And it proved to be to the young Luther an ideology, "real and of the future" which made "facts amenable to ideas and ideas to facts, creating a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of personal identity."<sup>10</sup> Erikson further elaborates:

This accounts for the acceptance of youth of mythologies and ideologies predicting the course of the universe or the historical trend; for even intelligent and practical youth can be glad to have the larger frame work settled, so that it can devote itself to the details which it can manage, for it knows what they stand for and where it stands. Thus "true" ideologies are verified by history for a time; for if they can inspire youth, youth will make the predicted history come more than true.<sup>11</sup>

Young people in their teens and twenties look to religion for an ideology. The ideology, true to form, becomes a way of life or what the Germans call a "Weltanschauung." A "true" ideology contributes a world view which is "consonant with existing theory, available knowledge, and common sense, and yet is significantly more: a utopian outlook, a cosmic mood, or a doctrinal logic, all shared as self-evident beyond any need for demonstration."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 22.

<sup>11</sup>Erikson, "Youth: Fidelity and Diversity," p. 16.

<sup>12</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 41.

### IDEOLOGICAL CONFIRMATION

This ideology may take ritualistic form and content in the church as seen in the indoctrination program of confirmation. The religious rite of confirmation or bar mitzvah becomes as Erikson writes "an ideological formula, intelligible both in terms of individual development and of significant tradition . . . [it] must do for the young person what the mother did for the infant: provide nutriment for the soul as well as for the stomach, and screen the environment so that vigorous growth may meet what it can manage."<sup>13</sup> Religious tradition provides in early pubescence that the adolescent be initiated into the community of adults and their historical perspective. The adolescent initiates are indoctrinated out of the community reservoir of knowledge and accumulated myths. At the proper time the initiates are dramatically presented to the assembled community for examination, recognition and acceptance. In bar mitzvah the father of the initiate reads a short prayer, which translated means: "Blessed (be He) who rid me of this one's punishment."<sup>14</sup> Thenceforth the father is

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>14</sup>Jacob Arlow, "A Psychoanalytic Study of a Religious Initiation Rite, Bar Mitzvah," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, vi (1951), 353-373.

no longer considered responsible for his son's moral transgressions and it is understood that the young man assumes the moral and religious obligations of the adults. Parallel is often drawn in confirmation to the episode in the life of the young pubertal Jesus, when he stayed behind in the temple to talk to the theologians. Mary, his mother reprimanded him and he replied firmly that he was about his (heavenly) father's business.<sup>15</sup> He too was in the process of detaching himself from parental dependence, establishing his own autonomy and direction in life.

In the puberty ritual the initiates are assumed ready to shed their pre-pubertal style of life and adopt the perspective of the community and the roles of an adult member. In the young man's speech in response to the rite, generally he first expresses his gratitude, then asserts that "today I am a man" and thirdly, promises fidelity to the historical perspective and allegiance to his people and ideals.<sup>16</sup> Symbolically,<sup>17</sup> the community bestows on the

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<sup>15</sup>Luke 2:41-51.    <sup>16</sup>Arlow, op. cit., p. 358.

<sup>17</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 265. Erikson makes a fascinating analogy relevant to our discussion of religious rites. "Freud has convincingly demonstrated the affinity of some religious ways of thought with those of neurosis. But we regress in our dreams too, and the inner structures of many dreams correspond to neurotic symptoms. Yet dreaming itself is a healthy activity, and a necessary one. And here too, the success of a dream depends on the

young man a new life, he becomes a "new man," free to be his own man. Subsequently the confirmed will begin to assert himself as an autonomous, free, ethically and sexually maturing person in his own right. The indoctrinational ceremony serves as a sharp reminder to the young person entering a new community and personal status both intellectually and biologically, forcing him to re-examine his attitude toward his masculinity and to heterosexual activity as the confirming fathers. Gradually becoming what he has been declared before the community, a man, he will feel ready to allow more enduring and profound love relations, ethical and vocational commitments. When the adolescent has emotionally approached these commitments, toward the end of adolescence, we may say that he has found himself.

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faith one has, not on that which one seeks: a good conscience provides that proverbially good sleep which knits up the raveled sleeve of care. All the things that made man feel guilty, ashamed, doubtful and mistrustful during the daytime are woven into a mysterious yet meaningful set of dream images, so arranged as to direct recuperative powers of sleep toward a constructive waking state. The dreamwork fails and the dream turns into a nightmare when there is an intrusion of a sense of foreign reality into the dreamer's make-believe, and a subsequent disturbance in returning from that super-imposed sense of reality into real reality. Religions try to use mechanisms analagous to dreamlife, reinforced at times by a collective genius of poetry and artistry, to offer ceremonial dreams of great recuperative value."

Perhaps to an outside observer the ritual of confirmation<sup>18</sup> and accompanying theological postulates appear meaningless. Nevertheless the tradition persists and the community, intuitively aware of the ideological polarization necessary in adolescence, holds the ritual to have theological truth, psychological use and meaning as the expression of their historical perspective. The community contends that the ritual of ideological confirmation has far reaching empirical consequences in the young person's life.<sup>19</sup> In the last analysis, a tree is known by its fruit.

The theological formulations of the community are not independent of the communities system of ethics. Conscience is an ethical concept. It is developed within the context of the objective structure of demands of the community. Conscience becomes a most personal interpretation of the goals of life. The transvaluation of the superego and its epigenetic consolidation into something personal and positive, gives it religious significance. Within the

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<sup>18</sup> Alan Paton, "Meditation For a Young Boy Confirmed," The Advent Papers (Cincinnati: Forward Movement, 1954), pp. 1-12.

<sup>19</sup> A brilliant study of ideological indoctrination from a political totalitarian perspective (communist) is to be found in Robert Jay Lifton's Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China (New York: Norton, 1963).

ideological structure of the community, the mature ethical and religious dimensions of conscience are crucial in building one's style of being. Autonomous conscience becomes a kind of generic self-guidance, giving total directedness. Conscience development within the religious community, historically connects with scripture and early tradition.

#### NEW TESTAMENT SYNEIDESIS

In the New Testament the word for conscience is syneidesis. The origin of the word is from a verb which means "to know." The basic Greek word syneidenai was common popular language and meant "being witness to oneself." The word described the act of observing oneself or being aware of oneself, often of judging oneself.<sup>20</sup> In Paul's use of the word syneidesis the basic sense of awareness is present. This cognitive, knowing and judging, aspect of syneidesis is especially evident in II Corinthians 4:2 and 5:11 where knowledge of another person's behavior is involved. In Romans 9:1 and II Corinthians 1:12, conscience bears witness to what it knows.

Paul writes that everyone has a conscience. In II Corinthians 4:2, he appealed to every man's conscience for

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<sup>20</sup>Alan Richardson (ed.), "Conscience," in his A Theological Word Book of The Bible (New York: Macmillan, 1952, p. 52.



approval. For Paul, conscience was not a special quality of Christians alone but an element of human nature generally.<sup>21</sup> In Romans 2:14-15, Paul expresses it very strongly:

When Gentiles who have no law obey instinctively the Law's requirements, they are a law to themselves, even though they have no law; they exhibit the effect of the Law written on their hearts, their conscience bears them witness, as their moral convictions accuse or, it may be, defend them. (Moffatt)

According to these words, conscience witnesses to the law (either Mosaic or natural law) but it does not contain the law. Therefore its judgment can be wrong. Paul speaks of a "weak conscience" in I Corinthians 8:7, when describing the narrow and timid attitude of Christians who are afraid to buy meat in the marketplace because it might have been used for sacrifices by the pagans in cultic practices. Paul criticizes such attitudes. But he emphasizes that even an erring conscience must be obeyed. He warns those who are strong in their conscience not to induce by their example, those who are weak to do things that would give them a guilty conscience. Paul in Romans 14 does not say that we must follow our conscience because it is right, but because disobedience to it will mean the loss of salvation and unity with God. In short we can lose our

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<sup>21</sup>Claude Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament (London: S C M Press, 1955), pp. 85f.

salvation even when we do something objectively right, if we do it with a guilty or uneasy conscience. The consistency and unity of the moral personality are more important to Paul than its subjection to a truth that endangers this unity. This is a significant insight regarding personality and its integration.<sup>22</sup>

Christianity has consistently maintained the doctrine of conscience explicated by Paul as an ethical conviction and moral responsibility of the individual coram Deo. Is there such a thing then as a Christian conscience? The Pauline and post-pauline writings indicate it as a faculty common to all men, functioning with varying degrees of success. Paul spoke of a Christian having a weak conscience who was still unable to overcome his religious awe of the pagan deities he formerly worshipped. This weak conscience lacked the support of certain knowledge. Because of ignorance it was unable to make correct ethical judgment, but judged morally indifferent acts to be wrong. In the post-pauline writings an evil conscience was described. This was not a conscience which erred in ignorance, but a conscience with evil intentions. In these writings the conscience was also seen subject to injury. It could be

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<sup>22</sup>Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (London: Nisbet, 1951), p. 155.

defiled, corrupted or seared, as in Hebrews 10:22.

In the New Testament, conscience is likewise not the judge of past behavior alone. It is a guide to future conduct, as in I Corinthians 8:10 and Romans 13:5. Paul, unlike common Greek usage, interpreted conscience as a determiner of future action. The future reference of conscience is not that of a state of moral precepts, but that of a power to judge proposed acts on the basis of ethical convictions which one has learned.

It is obvious that the New Testament writers did not offer a systematic doctrine of conscience. Basically, the common theme regarding conscience is that it is a matter of cognition, knowing. And a good conscience is a necessary element in the Christian life, for faith is impossible without a good conscience, as in I Timothy 1:19 and Romans 14:1 and the efficacy of prayer and baptism are affected by the state of conscience. Consistently in the New Testament and later in Luther, conscience is not a religious source. The authority of conscience is kept within the ethical sphere of cognition, knowing, awareness and learning.

Young Luther, New Testament scholar that he was, became himself the chief example of the seared or bruised

conscience. He struggled his entire lifetime for the good conscience; and his inner battle to overcome the evil-negative superego was never completely over.

Erikson in a sweeping over-view of historical periods, claims that it was exactly this, the negative superego against which the Renaissance rebelled.<sup>23</sup> The Renaissance movement rebelled against the fact that the church had begun to achieve dominance by misusing men's inclination to live by a negative superego. Negative superego means a life attitude in which man bases his identity on his awareness of sinfulness. Erikson imaginatively interprets that the church in Luther's time promised deliverance from bodily desires, if man resigned himself to his negative superego, giving the church the authority to punish and reward.

Luther reneged. He sought the positive conscience. But he did not bypass the negative superego as did Renaissance man; he sought the positive conscience via the negative one. Luther's weapons in the struggle were the same as those of Renaissance humanism: a return to the original texts of scripture, a definite anthropomorphism (in christocentric form), and a concentration on using the special gift hidden

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<sup>23</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 193.

in one's own being--in Luther's case, verbal expression:

On the frontier of conscience, the dirty work never stops, the lying old words are never done with and the new purities remain forever dimmed. . . . To Luther the inspired voice, the voice that means it, the voice that really communicates in person, became a new kind of sacrament. . . . He obviously felt himself to be the evangelical giver of a substance which years of suffering had made his to give; an all-embracing verbal generosity developed in him, so that he did not wish to compete with professional talkers, but to speak to the people so that the least could understand him: "You must preach," he said, "as a mother suckles her child."<sup>24</sup>

Luther's later fatherly contribution to his Christian community and its youth was in being a "guiding voice," that pastoral guarantor of a people's right to a positive, "joyous" conscience. And "the voice that meant it" in proclamation and in print was especially a sponsor of the young and their right to live by the inclinations of a creative conscience. His catechism written for their ideological confirmation showed this pastoral concern.

#### GUILT AND THE POSITIVE CONSCIENCE

Luther's respect for the "inspired voice" is historically flavored by his belonging to the community whose tradition goes back to Jewish lineage. Particularly in the prophets, Judaism stressed a personal responsibility before God. This prepared for the rise of what we call the personal

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<sup>24</sup>Ibid., pp. 197-198.

autonomous conscience by creating a definite ego consciousness. Tillich quotes a modern philosopher who said that the self has been discovered by sin. Self-consciousness from the merely logical does not have such a powerful position. And without practical knowledge about oneself, produced by the experience of moral law and guilt, no practical self-consciousness and no conscience would have developed.

Tillich proposes that even Frederick Nietzsche, who attacks more devastatingly than anyone the judging conscience, derives the birth of the "inner man" from the appearance of conscience. After analyzing guilt and punishment in primitive cultures and seeing their subpersonal character, Nietzsche praises the discovery of conscience as the elevation of mankind to a higher level. The fact that self and conscience are dependent on the experience of personal guilt explains the prevalence of the negative superego in life and theory.<sup>25</sup> Such prevalence supports the assertion that the negative critical superego is the original phenomenon. Since superego and ego grow in mutual interdependence and since the ego discovers itself in the experience of a split between what it is and what it ought

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<sup>25</sup>Supra, p. 154.

to be, the basic character of the conscience--the character of guilt--is obvious.

But is the character of guilt and the ought obvious, to all, say to Freud? Freud repudiated the accusation often brought against him that he ignored the more positive aspects of conscience and the moral life, including the mature conscience of the ought. In his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis<sup>26</sup> Freud writes:

It is no part of our intention to deny the nobility of human nature, nor have we ever done anything to disparage its value. On the contrary I show you not only the evil wishes which are censored, but also the censorship which suppresses them and makes them unrecognizable. We dwell upon the evil in human beings with the greater emphasis only because others deny it, thereby making the mental life of mankind not indeed better, but incomprehensible. If we give up the one-sided ethical valuation, then we are surer to find the truer formula of the relation of evil to good in human nature.<sup>27</sup>

Freud did not find "the nobility of human nature" easy to define. It is surely more than the capacity to suppress evil wishes or censor them. And to make evil wishes unrecognizable is certainly not the distinguishing mark of a morally mature man. The nature of the moral life, of moral obligation, of the ought Freud left to others. His

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<sup>26</sup> Supra, pp. 78-81.

<sup>27</sup> John McKenzie, Guilt: Its Meaning and Significance (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 42.

concern was much more with the "must" superego than with the "ought" conscience. There is very little in his theoretical formulations that take us on from what is desired to what ought to be desired. And further, if the nature of the ought is missing in Freud, so is an account of objective guilt.

The central weakness of Freudian moral psychology lies . . . in its failure to deal adequately with the nature of moral obligation, and this in turn is due to the obscurity which surrounds the treatment of the cognitive and emotional components of conscious obligation; it seems to consist in submission to authority, whether internal or external. The emotional basis is, in either case, fear of punishment or of losing the love of those around us, or of our aggression towards those whom we love. The attitude towards ourselves when the moral sanctions have been internalized retain all the characteristics it had when the authority was external. Nothing is said of the possibility in the advanced levels of moral development or self-imposed rules, or respect for principles of conduct rationally accepted as binding.<sup>28</sup>

However before we continue further let us momentarily re-view Freud's analysis of and contribution to the problem of guilt. Freud found that in his therapeutic relationship with neurotic and psychotic people that he inevitably came back to the early childhood of the patient. This meant experiencing anew intolerable anxiety and the clash between love and hate. Quite simply in the Oedipus complex, a healthy boy achieved a relationship with his mother in

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 43.



which instinct was involved and in which dreams contained an in-love relationship with her. This in turn led to dreams of the death of the father, which evoked strong fear of the father and the morbid fear that the father would destroy the child's instinctual potential. Freud labeled this the castration-complex. At the same time there was the boy's love of the father and his respect for him. The boy's conflict between that side of his nature which made him hate and want to harm his father and the other side by which he loved him, involved the boy in a sense of guilt. Guilt implied to Freud that the boy could tolerate and hold the conflict, which is in fact an inherent conflict. It of necessity belongs to the healthy life.

Recapitulating further, we recall that it was in 1923 that Freud introduced a new concept, the superego. With this Freud was indicating that the ego, in coping with the id, employed certain forces which were worthy of an inclusive name. Freud postulated that the child gradually acquired controlling forces. The Oedipus complex meant that the boy introjected the respected and feared father and therefore carried about with him controlling forces based on what the child saw and felt about his father. Freud perceived that this introjected father-figure was highly subjective, colored by the child's experiences with father-figures

other than the actual father and by the cultural pattern of the family.

In his concept of the superego is the proposition then that the genesis of guilt is a matter of inner reality or an unconscious intention. A clinical problem of masturbation during adolescence briefly may illustrate for us the postulate that guilt resides in the intention. The deepest reasons for guilt feelings surrounding masturbation and auto-erotic activities generally is not that masturbation is a crime. It is that in the total phantasy of masturbation is gathered together all the conscious and unconscious intention.<sup>29</sup>

Out of the concept of the superego a great deal has developed. The brilliant child analyst, Melanie Klein,<sup>30</sup> has hypothesized the internalization of the superego and the Oedipus much earlier than Freud. She contends that the idea of the introjection of the father-figure has turned out to be too simple. She believes that there is an early

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<sup>29</sup>See the essay by Marjorie Harley, "Masturbation Conflicts" in the book Adolescents: Psychoanalytic Approach to Problems and Therapy edited by Sandor Lorand and Henry Schneer (New York: Dell, 1961), p. 64 f.

<sup>30</sup>Melanie Klein, Our Adult World and Its Roots In Infancy (London: Tavistock, 1960), p. 9 ff.

infant history of the superego in each individual. She postulates that the introject may become human and father-like, but in earlier infant stages the superego introjects, used for control of id-impulses and id projects are sub-human and indeed fantastically cruel, sadistic and primitive. As a consequence of her work, child clinicians are beginning to study guilt-sense in each individual infant and child as it develops from crude anxiety and fear to something akin to a relationship to a revered human being, one who can understand and forgive.

If we ask the question at what age in the normal child's development can the capacity for guilt-sense be said to become established, we answer with Klein's findings about the first year of the infant's life. And this really includes the whole period in which the infant is having a clearly human two-body relationship with the mother. However there are real difficulties in fixing the date of the origin of guilt feelings in the normal infant. And although it is a matter of considerable interest to seek an answer, it is in fact not crucial for our discussion.

What is important is that the child, in favorable circumstances, gradually builds up a capacity for guilt-sense in relation to the mother. And because of the early cruel and sadistic superego and the projected phantasy of ruthless,

aggressive attacks on the mother (the source of all good), the infant's need for opportunity to make reparation and restitution is imperative.<sup>31</sup> With the capacity for concern and the impulse to restitutive gestures, the child begins to be in a position to experience the Oedipus complex and to tolerate the ambivalence that is inherent in that later stage in which the child, if mature, is involved in triangular relationships: child, mother and father. The normal development of the personality then is toward the development of a personal moral sense, culminating in adolescence. When the developing child begins to accept the fact of his personally doing wrong, and accepts the guilt feelings which result from such activity, then the fear of consequences gradually play a subordinate part. The personal sense of guilt implies that the superego and ego are coming to terms: that anxiety has matured into a sense of guilt. This is postulated as a healthy sign of normal development. The child is beginning to take responsibility for his own behavior. This is behavior motivated not merely by fear of losing love but because the young person sees his behavior as wrong and experiences the feeling, "I ought not to have done that." He not only

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<sup>31</sup>Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (London: Hogarth, 1962), p. 65 ff.

knows that wrong behavior is disapproved but he disapproves of it himself. The transition from superego control to conscience, moral, personal and positive, is beginning. It is a very gradual achievement but it is imperative for normal, healthy personality development.

D. W. Winnicott, following Klein, states that "a capacity to experience guilt feelings is a necessary attribute of the healthy person. . . . It is part of the price we pay for the privilege of being human (moral) beings."<sup>32</sup> The acceptance of legitimate guilt feelings means personally accepting responsibility for one's behavior, which is movement in the personality towards moral and rational control.

To accept guilt feelings is to accept moral values and ideals which requires a degree of moral insight and cognition. Flugel, an early psychoanalytic author claims that moral judgments and values are rooted in desire motivated by the pleasure principle. He writes that their roots are "oretic" meaning rooted in the emotional and striving aspects of the mind.<sup>33</sup> When Winnicott postulates that accepting guilt is a mark of growing maturity, he certainly

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<sup>32</sup>Donald Winnicott, "Psycho-analysis and the Sense of Guilt," from Psycho-Analysis and Contemporary Thought (London: Hogarth, 1958), pp. 19 ff.

<sup>33</sup>J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (New York: International Universities Press, 1945), p. 254.

is indicating not only what is desired but what ought to be desired. What ought to be, a characteristic of conscience if disregarded or violated, results in guilt.

The transition from a "must" borrowed morality of the superego to a positive conscience is a normal process of development and maturity. If this theme of striving and need of a defining object is absent the unity of the personality is threatened. Fixation on a "must" superego level will deteriorate one's style of being and integration. Acceptance of the ought conscience comes with the adolescent developing an ideal for himself blending into the positive structure of "proprie striving."<sup>34</sup> Because of the unique attributes and developmental tasks required of the adolescent, the acquiring of moral consciousness and awareness is postulated as normal.

How to facilitate this transition from the negative aspects of the "must" superego is complex. For all aspects of the developing superego are affected: emotional, cognitive and conative. No longer sustained by fear of punishment or loss of love, the mature conscience gradually shifts to the proprium. When the developing adolescent

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<sup>34</sup>Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 136.

follows a course of action because he believes that it is right, formal thought and the sense of obligation are co-operating. An environmental atmosphere permeated with moral and intellectual integrity promotes such cooperation.

Erikson says:

Because man needs a disciplined conscience, he thinks he must have a bad one; and he assumes that he has a good conscience when, at times, he has an easy one. The answer to all this does not lie in attempts to avoid or to deny one or the other sense of badness in children altogether; the denial of the unavoidable can only deep a sense of secret, unmanageable evil. The answer lies in man's capacity to create order which will give his children a disciplined as well as a tolerant conscience, and a world within to act affirmatively.<sup>35</sup>

The adolescent who goes beyond doing only what will please parental figures, externally or internally, is guided not by the desire to win parental praise but because he desires to be praiseworthy. This quality is conducive to moral integrity and personal unity.

McKenzie defines conscience in psychological terms:

Conscience is that sentiment which coordinates and regulates our moral ideas, emotions and behavior according to the moral values, moral ideals and moral principles . . . consciously or unconsciously assimilated.<sup>36</sup>

Unlike the critical superego, the positive conscience is

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<sup>35</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 263.

<sup>36</sup>McKenzie, op. cit., p. 54.

oriented to the future. It goes beyond the deposit of past developmental threats; a creative conscience directs a person towards the future, to that which he is becoming, a unity of intention. And a personal conscience calls the adolescent into his uniqueness, particularity and individuality. These ideals of conscience develop under the aegis of new cognitive formal thinking,<sup>37</sup> new identification and expanding capacity for social and ideological experiences.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Boss quotes Pascal: "Thus all our dignity lies in thought. By thought we must raise ourselves, not by space and time, which we cannot fill. Let us strive then to think well--therein is the principle of morality." Pascal does not mean by thought technical reason but self-consciousness, the reason which knows also the reason of the heart. Medard Boss, Psychoanalysis and Daseinanalysis (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 42.

<sup>38</sup> Fromm's humanistic conscience is important at least in that it emphasizes the need to outgrow the critical superego. "The humanistic conscience is not an internalized voice of authority we are eager to please and afraid of displeasing; it is our own voice present in every human being and independent of external sanctions and rewards. . . . Conscience judges our functioning as human beings; it is knowledge within oneself, knowledge of respective success or failure in the art of living. But although conscience is knowledge, it is more than mere knowledge in the realm of abstract thought. It has an affective quality, for it is the reaction of the total personality and not only the reaction of the mind. In fact we need not be aware of what our conscience says in order to be influenced by it.

"Actions, thoughts and feelings which are conclusive to the proper functioning and unfolding of the total personality produces a feeling of inner approval, of rightness, characteristic of humanistic 'good conscience.' On the other hand, acts, thoughts and feelings injurious to



The authority of the autonomous conscience stems from the fact that it acts on behalf of the whole personality and that it is directly related to the fundamental need in the personality for unity. A famous quote of Bishop Butler often repeated is: "had conscience the power as it has the authority it would rule the world." Psychoanalysis has empirically proven its position of power. It will split the personality rather than permit its moral disintegration. It refuses to condone behavior contrary to its moral ideals. And finally its power can be seen in the process of repression so ably investigated by Freud.<sup>39</sup>

On the positive side, it is the power generated by autonomous conscience that guides young Luther at Worms to maintain his moral unity and integrity to stand firm and not to recant. That it is not right to do something against autonomous conscience is based on the traditional Christian doctrine of conscience. Luther's refusal to disavow the

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our total personality produce a feeling of uneasiness and discomfort, characteristic of a 'guilty conscience.' Conscience is thus a reaction of ourselves to ourselves. It is the voice of our true selves which summons us back to ourselves, to live productively, to develop fully and harmoniously--that is to become what we potentially are. It is the guardian of our integrity . . . humanistic conscience can justly be called the voice of our loving care of ourselves." Erick Fromm, Man For Himself (New York: Rinehart, 1947), p. 158.

<sup>39</sup>Supra, p. 1 ff.

doctrine of justification is an expression of his conscientiousness as a theologian.<sup>40</sup> He declares that he would recant if refuted by arguments taken from scripture or reason, the positive source and the negative criterion of theology. But he does not say that his conscience is the source of his doctrine. There is no valid precedent for this either in New Testament thought or in classical Christianity.

However it was from young Luther's experience of justification that he derived and the western world inherited a new understanding of conscience. In becoming a novice in the Augustinian order, Luther's monastic scrutiny of conscience took shape when he felt the threat of ultimate judgment in its full depth and horror. He suffered recurrent "attacks" which he called "Anfechtungen."<sup>41</sup> Not easily translated, the term can be rendered by "attacks of temptation" or "anxiety attacks." Young Luther saw these attacks originating in Satan, the mask of divine wrath. This terrifying ordeal of the experience of anxiety attacks creates in the human being incredible angst, which means death anxiety and

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<sup>40</sup>Tillich, op. cit., p. 156.

<sup>41</sup>Gordon Rupp, The Righteousness of God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953), p. 106 f.

dread. It was described by young Luther as a feeling of being enclosed in a narrow place from which there is no escape. This is the linguistic meaning of angst properly understood by Luther when he mentions angustiae, "the narrows" as being related. When experiencing "the narrows" Luther cried in despair and hatred to God that he was being driven from the surface of the earth. This overwhelming experience was described by Luther in many ways. He compares the horrified, stricken conscience that "tries to flee and cannot escape with a goose that, pursued by the wolf, does not use its wings as ordinarily, but its feet and is caught." Or he tells us how the moving of dry leaves frightens him as the expression of the wrath and judgment of God. And Luther's conscience confirms the wrath and judgment of God as being just. "For where sin is, there is no good conscience, but only insecurity and incessant fear of death and hell, with which no joy or pleasure can abide in the bottom of the heart, but as Leviticus says, such a heart is terrified at a rustling leaf."<sup>42</sup> To Luther, God speaks and he hears, "Thou canst not judge differently about thyself." Tillich rightly insists that such anxiety experiences are not dependent on<sup>43</sup> sins committed. Man as

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>43</sup>Tillich, op. cit., p. 163.

man is guilty and this before any act or behavior. Man as man is estranged from God, unable and unwilling to love him.

"And this is the worst of all ills, that conscience cannot run away from itself."<sup>44</sup> The negative superego deepens into a state of despair.<sup>45</sup> This radical state can be overcome only through intervention, through acceptance of divine love (agape) made visible in a truly liberated man, Jesus as the Christ. Through his singular freedom and sacrificial love man is restored; unity is reestablished with God. Guilty man is accepted in spite of guilt--sinful man, in spite of his sinfulness. Divine wrath and retribution no longer frighten the man who is forgiven. A positive "joyful conscience arises as much above the moral realm as the desperate conscience was below the moral realm."<sup>46</sup>

Luther's experience and understanding of "justification by faith," results in a new creation, the creation of (in Tillich's terms) a "transmoral" conscience. Tillich postulates that a conscience may be called "transmoral" if it

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<sup>44</sup>Rupp, op. cit., p. 109.

<sup>45</sup>John Von Rohr, "The Sources of Luther's Self-Despair in the Monastery," Journal of Bible and Religion, XIX, 1 (January 1951), 6-11.

<sup>46</sup>Tillich, op. cit., p. 78.

guides and judges not in obedience to a moral law but according to its participation in a reality that transcends the sphere of moral obligation and demands. Young Luther's identification with the singularly free man and the consequent experience of justification allowed him that participation of transcendence. Tillich correctly cautions that "a transmoral conscience does not deny the moral realm but is driven beyond it by the unbearable tensions of the sphere of law."<sup>47</sup>

In anfechtungen, God becomes the accuser and man's heart tries to excuse itself. In justification, man becomes the accuser and God defends him against himself. Psychologically translated this indicates that insofar as man looks to himself, he experiences a negative superego. Insofar as he looks to the reality of a "new creation beyond" himself, manifest as freedom, he can know a positive conscience. With this new conscience man triumphs on the side of God. It is not because of moral perfection but in spite of moral imperfection.

Coming out of this Lutheran background--and analagous to young Luther's personal and theological struggle against a negative conscience, Nietzsche fights the same battle on

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

the "unconquered frontier of the tragic conscience."<sup>48</sup>

Tillich states that Nietzsche was an empiricist who tried to analyze the genesis of moral conscience in such a way that its autonomy was destroyed. This destruction was based on his rejection of any universal or natural law. Nietzsche tragically ended as a split personality denying any objective validity to the voice of conscience. In Genealogy of Morals he wrote "the bad conscience is a sickness, but it is a sickness as pregnancy is one." In short it was a creative sickness. His argument ran:

Mankind had to be domesticated, and this has been done by its conquerors and ruling classes. It was in the interest of these classes to suppress by severe punishment the natural instincts of aggressiveness, will to power, destruction, cruelty, revolution. They succeeded in suppressing these trends. But they did not succeed in eradicating them. So the aggressive instincts became internalized and transformed into self-destructive tendencies. Man has turned against himself in self-punishment; he is separated from his animal past from which he had derived joy and creativity. But he cannot prevent his instincts from remaining alive. They require permanent acts of suppression, the result of which is the bad conscience, a great thing in man's evolution, an ugly thing if compared with man's real aim.<sup>49</sup>

The aim of man in his whole life time is described by Nietzsche in terms reminiscent of young Luther's free man of transmoral conscience. "Once in a stronger period than

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<sup>48</sup>Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 195.

<sup>49</sup>Tillich, op. cit., p. 164.

our morbid, desperate present, he must appear, the man of the great love and the great contempt, the creative spirit, who does not allow his driving strength to be turned to a transcendent world."<sup>50</sup> This new man is called by Nietzsche the one "who is strong through wars and victories, who needs conquest, adventure, danger, even pain. In the moral sense and realm he is 'beyond good and evil.'" However this new man is good in the metaphysical sense because he is in unity with life and the life forces. Nietzsche claims that this free man has a transmoral conscience not like Luther's free man participating in a paradoxical unity with God through Jesus as Christ, but on the basis of a spontaneous unity with life in all its creative and destructive power.

Nietzsche was widely read at the time Freud was writing. Freud claimed he had tried to read him but found his thought so rich that he renounced the attempt. However, Freud added that "Nietzsche had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was likely to live."<sup>51</sup> Freud remained less profound in understanding man's total predicament than Nietzsche because:

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp. 164-165.

<sup>51</sup> Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (New York: Basic Books, 1955), II, 344.

Man's fundamental problem is to achieve true "existence" instead of letting life be no more than just another accident. In The Gay Science Nietzsche hits on the formulation which brings out the essential paradox of any distinction between self and true self: "What does your conscience say?--You shall become who you are." Nietzsche maintains this conception until the end, and the full title of his last work is Ecco Homo, Wie man wird, was man ist--how one becomes what one is.<sup>52</sup>

Nietzsche was an early existential analyst. His later spokesman, the presently living existential philosopher, Martin Heidegger follows Nietzsche and also Luther when he states: "The call of conscience has the character of the demand that man in his finitude actualize his genuine potentialities, and this means an appeal to become guilty."<sup>53</sup> We have indicated that Freud never spoke of such existential guilt, but only of guilt feelings. The theologian and the existentialist perceive man as primarily guilty. Man is guilty because he is "indebted to all the requests that his future keeps in store for him until he breathes his last."<sup>54</sup> Man's guilt consists in his failing to carry out the mandate to fulfill all the authentic possibilities given to him. When these possibilities are

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<sup>52</sup>Rollo May, Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1958), p. 31.

<sup>53</sup>Tillich, op. cit., p. 165.

<sup>54</sup>Boss, op. cit., p. 121.



turned inward, a negative superego is experienced.

Existential analysis postulates that man is to become aware of his existence and that his existence is guilty. He is guilty when he hears the never ending call of conscience. Autonomous conscience summons us to ourselves, "to become who we are." The significant tense for human beings then is the future tense--what am I called to be, what am I pointing toward.<sup>55</sup> The call of conscience to become speaks to us according to Heidegger in "the mode of silence."<sup>56</sup> Conscience calls us to act and to become guilty by acting. He who acts experiences the call of conscience "in silence," since it is impossible not to act and since every action implies guilt. Man is called to become, to act, and the attitude in which he is becoming and acting is called

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<sup>55</sup>May, op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>56</sup>Ebeling comments on Heidegger's interpretation that the call of conscience is not voiced in any way. The call of conscience "does not go the length of putting itself into words at all--and nevertheless remains anything but obscure and undefined. Conscience's mode of speaking is only and always that of silence. Therein it not only does not lose anything of its intelligibility, but also forces its own silentness on the being it calls and summons. The absence of a formulation of its call in words, does not give the phenomenon the indefiniteness of a mysterious voice, but merely indicates that the understanding on the part of the person 'called' must not cling to the expectation of information or such like." Gerhard Ebeling, "Theological Reflections on Conscience," in his Word and Faith (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 420.

"courage."<sup>57</sup> Courage transcends the moral conscience--its arguments and prohibitions. The autonomous conscience positive and personal consists in courageously accepting the negative superego which is unavoidable as long as decisions are made and acts performed. In spite of guilt man has a future, and the future calls him to be responsible to himself and others.

He will let all his possibilities of relating to the world be used as the luminated realm into which all he encounters may come to its full emergence, into its genuine being, and unfold in its meaning to the fullest possible extent. Man's option to respond to this claim or to choose not to do so seems to be the very core of human freedom. Once this kind of basic freedom is reached, the former burdens of a bad conscience and of guilt . . . give way without further ado to a happy readiness of being thus needed by the phenomena of our world.<sup>58</sup>

Is this idea of freedom, of a transmoral conscience really tenable? Tillich charges that if it is untenable, then so is psychoanalytic therapy and religion. For in both experiences the moral conscience is transcended. The way beyond the moral conscience into freedom in religion is "by acceptance of the divine grace that breaks through the realm of law" and creates a positive conscience. And in depth psychotherapy it is by the "acceptance of one's own

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<sup>57</sup> Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), pp. 128 ff.

<sup>58</sup> Boss, op. cit., p. 271.

conflict when looking at them and suffering under their ugliness without an attempt to suppress them and to hide them from oneself."<sup>59</sup> From Lutheran and existential understanding of man's paradoxical existence, Tillich draws the proper conclusion.

Indeed it is impossible not to transcend the moral conscience because it is impossible to unite a sensitive and a good conscience. Those who have a sensitive conscience cannot escape the question of the transmoral conscience. The moral conscience drives beyond the sphere in which it is valid to the sphere from which it must receive its conditional validity.<sup>60</sup>

The sphere of freedom to which man is called becomes the legitimate battlefield where religious concern and personal identity meet. Because adolescence is an ideological search after inner coherence and identity confirmation, adolescents are not exempt. In fact they are in the thick of it. By the very fact of their search, they are pulled toward the future and forced into existential encounters. If the adolescent fails to heed the call, forfeiting it, he forfeits the courage to become himself. Identity diffusion is avoided tragically through identity coarctation. And the future tense that is rightfully his becomes irrelevant.

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<sup>59</sup>Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 166.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid.

## **CHAPTER FOUR:**

### **CONCLUSION**

I have indicated that Freud from his earliest writings was vitally concerned with the problem of morality and its effect on mental life. From his analytic work he became convinced that man is not only much more immoral than he thinks, but also much more moral than he knows. In over forty years of analyzing and theorizing on the problem the repressive and restrictive character of morality was the aspect that interested him most. And during these years, nuclear concepts remained central, contributing to his final elaboration of the psychic structure called the superego. Of these key concepts--identification, Oedipus complex, ambivalence and the father-identification is the basic construct. The genesis of the superego, Freud claimed, stems from the child's identification with his father. The destructive impulses and aggression are re-directed inward. Once the ego is split into the oppressor and oppressed, the censor and censored, the personality continues its own self criticism and punishment.

However there are several issues in the theory of identification as it relates to superego development that are left unanswered. One critical theoretical issue is the "pre-historical" identification with the father that Freud continued to mention but never clarified. There is also the problematic issue concerning later identification. It is

clear to the very end of his work that Freud regarded the final identification with the father or parents--the one productive of the superego--as being of the introjective variety. One wonders how the later authorities, who take the place of the parents, influence the superego given Freud's statement that they need not be introjected. How do later identifications with authority figures modify the superego? Beyond entertaining the idea, Freud did not go. He did not specify how the modification of the superego takes place. In fact paradoxically he retracted the idea indicating that later models, identifications and values do not really influence the superego. It remains determined by the earliest parental images.

For Freud, the superego remained always a schismatic deposit of past developmental threats. A protracted superego development, comparable to the extended development of the ego, was not a real issue for him. Perhaps what contributed to this "lacuna" was Freud's inability to take into account the phenomenology of the future or to consider the essential unity of intention of the personality. When such questions arose, Freud demurred by hinting that it lied beyond the point of his investigations and observations. The search for inner coherence through a unity of intention, ideals, goals, decision and courage was data he

did not adequately investigate nor consider. His superego construct, established in and determined by the past, remained essentially closed to modification. The viewpoint presented in this study is that an adequate conception of the structure and function of the superego must include the superego's move beyond the closedness of its critical punitive aspects. The critical superego is inadequate until it becomes part of the development of the restructured superego system available in the psychic realignment of adolescence.

Another serious limitation of Freud's theoretical formulations besides his inability to envisage an epigenetic superego is his neglect of the mother in the early genesis of the superego. Melanie Klein as we have seen, rightfully corrected Freud on this point. It is the intense human two-body relationship between mother and child which elicits the early superego in all its cruel, sadistic and primitive fantasy attacks on the mother image. Out of this symbiotic relationship the capacity for guilt-sense has its genesis. An interesting postulate to consider and recommend for further scientific research is the idea that the primitive superego may be the original psychic deposit and that the ego is a defensive split from this anlage, protecting itself consequently from the primal threat of

death anxiety.

Perhaps the critical and moralistic superego may be an overspecialization in the human race like the late dinosaur's excessive body armor. Is this primitive developmental mechanism destined and intended to be the central support of all our ideological and ethical commitments? I think not. This study presents the viewpoint that when the individual enters the adolescent phase of growth, he becomes psychically and cognitively ready to modify and to restructure his critical superego and moralistic proclivities.

In the critical conscious and unconscious upheavals and realignments taking place in adolescence, the relinquishing of incestuous sexual and hostile aggressive wishes is imperative. The reorientation of the superego, demands a reconciliation between the internal idealized sexually prohibiting parental images with external present reality and the new perception of the parental figures as sexually active and permissive. The resulting modified superego will still enforce the taboo on incest and parricide but at the same time open the barriers of repression so that a new freedom results, sexually and ethically. This modification of internal early images, changes in the moral code of the punitive superego along with the new capacity for



formal thought and identifications will promote new values, ethical principles and goals based on a firm re-establishment of the taboo on incest and parricide.

The rapid psychophysiological changes, emotional turmoil and conflicts plunge the adolescent into much confusion and anxiety, causing dramatic clashes between progressive and regressive forces. The responding need for order and integration is sought in an ideological overview. The inner need for ideological polarization is directly connected to the stress and changes occurring. The modification of the superego by new identifications, social reality, ideological perspective and ideals assists the adolescent in his search for inner coherence and personality integration.

There is no guarantee of course that the ideology sought out will be of a positive nature. In his search for that combination of freedom and control, adventure and tradition, the adolescent may exploit and be exploited by the most varied of commitments. But because of his turmoil, ideological realignment is by necessity in process, and a number of ideological possibilities are waiting to be ordered by opportunity, leadership or friendship. And any indoctrination worth its "ideological salt" also harbors dangers which bring about the unmaking of some adolescents

and the transcendence of others.

Erikson's discussion of adolescent ideological realignment is brilliant and correct. However his neglect of superego realignment in adolescence is not correct. Erikson is an ego psychologist in the best tradition of Hartmann and Freud himself. The current enthusiasm ego psychology is enjoying is in large part because of his labors. However there has been the growing tendency, perhaps because of current enthusiasm, to assign a greater and greater share of the total personality organization to the ego. My position in this study is that with the current enthusiasm of discovery, its operations have been perhaps over-estimated. The ego is seen falsely as performing certain functions which would best be considered as part of the superego system. Erikson for one delimits the mature ego ideal from the superego. As a general criticism I believe that he does not sufficiently consider the structural and functional maturation of the superego system as a whole in adolescent phase of growth. The epigenetic superego also contributes directly to the synthesis and integration of the personality in adolescence. Arising and maturing in diversity and unity, the psychic structures gradually coordinate with the respective operational methods becoming thereby enriched and endowed with a new variability and

flexibility.

We do not yet know all that we need to know about the psychic upheaval and realignment going on to fully understand the adolescent crisis. We do know that the adolescent has a strong need for new identifications and ego ideal models. This brings us to another questionable point. It is likely that Klein's viewpoint on the genesis of the superego with the mother is correct. This does not automatically make Freud's emphasis on the role of the father incorrect. Freud explicated the role and influence the father plays in the Oedipal superego development. This rôle and influence of the father on moral development is seen to continue into adolescence. In fact the adolescent's fundamental and leading identification is with the father as a man, extending quite naturally to his position as a husband and a father. The significant role and moral influence of the father has been investigated and supported in recent university research.<sup>1</sup> According to these studies the father is seen as the principle moral authority in the family and accordingly the principle object of later moral identification for both boys and girls. Further, in almost

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<sup>1</sup>Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Development and Identification," Child Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 308 ff.

all societies the father is the dominant authority regardless of the individual family role pattern. Added authority stems from his prestige as the owner of the family resources. His power and position as moral authority is crucial for ideological and ethical development in the adolescent. Present data<sup>2</sup> supports the hypothesis that the mature ego ideal and conscience is a gradual epigenetic development in adolescence, relating closely to new identifications and to new cognitive capacity for ideological perspective and ethical values.

#### THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS

These new ideological and ethical propensities of the adolescent find integration in the functioning of an epigenetic conscience that is both flexible and strong. Young Luther's religious struggles to find a way through his critical superego to an autonomous conscience, personal and positive, resulted from identification processes both with significant persons and with ideological forces. The modification of the superego found in this case study and in adolescence in general has wide and varied therapeutic implications.

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<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

The significant father figure in young Luther's life was Staupitz. Staupitz is the prototype of the wise fatherly sponsor and understanding pastoral counselor. His role as spiritual mentor was decisive for Luther's growth and psychic realignment. Despite Luther's struggles, his intense subjectivity, sexual diffusion and his overwhelming search for a face of recognition and confirmation, Staupitz was not put off. In fact Staupitz enjoyed young Luther, enjoyed fathering a new birth--a new identity in this confused late adolescent of religious inclination. Unlike many adults, Staupitz was not hostile to the adolescent in turmoil and search for positive goals and orientation. He was not overly threatened by the sharp fluctuations of mood, deep subjectivity, sexual diffusion and impulsive behavior that alternated with compulsive restraint. Adults who wish to be fatherly sponsors and spiritual mentors must be no less courageous and wise. A good father will understand that such paradoxical mood swings, vacillation in identifications and psychic dissolution and realignment is not only necessary but normal. The good sponsor will encourage the adolescent not to bury his conflicts and diffusion but keep them alive in order to deal with them and work them through, testing out solutions before prematurely fixating on anyone as the most suitable. To avoid the struggles is to crystallize too soon in fixed responses,

to settle too easily for false solutions marked by value stasis and cognitive sterotypy. The symptom of grief and mourning is a good sign that the adolescent is detaching himself from early love objects and wishes, making new identifications and commitments possible. The seeking for a new object choice, instinctual freedom, freedom of thought, feeling, action, and freedom from archaic superego and id pressures indicates that a radical realignment is in healthy process.

Freedom means ideological polarization and ethical allegiance. It means resolution of bisexual diffusion. Freedom means behavior without recourse to the two extremes of complete instinctual liberty or complete instinctual renunciation. Freedom means a sense of command over one's potentialities, a capacity to formulate and anticipate the future in a coherent way, a feeling of being an agent in one's own behalf. It means self control. The casualties of this critical period of adolescence are those who seem to lack the position, capacity or inclination to become free agents in their own behalf. They drift. The fatherly sponsor and guarantor has the responsibility to put before all diffused adolescents an ideological structure, an order of religious belief, an orientation that the adolescent can interiorize for himself or reject. The counselor and

spiritual mentor should personify in himself the resolution of the id-superego conflict and the basic integrity gotten through existential decision and religious perspective. The fatherly sponsor is that unique adult who knows that an individual life is a providential coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of history. And for him, all his integrity stands or falls with the life style in which he partakes. The life style of integrity and freedom developing out of commitment, historical perspective and faith has been for him the patrimony of his soul, the seal of his autonomous conscience. Such a position and way of life becomes contagious. It elicits transference and identification. It encourages the adolescent's participation in the larger community ready to nourish him through its symbols, rites and rituals of confirmation and indoctrination. The religious community becomes the adolescent's super-family, offering him a sense of direction, mutual concern and a shared purpose.

The inner need of the adolescent for such sponsorship means that the young patient often appoints and invests the counselor with this sponsor role. This occurs through the singular power of transference. But this elemental tie of transference is complemented by the patient's relation to his counselor as a "new person" who clarifies the

inappropriateness of the young patient's transferences from the past. As with Staupitz, true mentorship, far from being a showy form of emotional sympathy, is always of a discipline of a perspective and method. No good fatherly sponsor need protest human respect, personal friendship or paternal love. But he must recognize what his sponsor role is in what is happening in the therapeutic encounter.

The fatherly sponsor, giving retroactive sanction to the efficacy of maternal trust, knows the conflicted adolescent wants a "face to face" meeting. The adolescent patient does not fit on the couch. He wants to face his sponsor and wants his sponsor to face him, not as a facsimile of a parent or wearing a mask of a professional helper but as a kind of over-all individual a young person can live by or despair of. This horizontal face to face encounter has a vertical dimension as well. Young Luther wanted also God's recognition. The search for cosmic recognition and forgiveness is an aspect in his and in all religion which the sponsor must consider to understand the deepest nostalgia of the lonely, conflicted youth facing him.

To gain recognition and integration by claiming the total presence of the good father is identical with the adolescent's need for ideological confirmation. Fatherly affirmation and ideological confirmation cannot be



integrated before the developmental phase of adolescence for all manner of maturational reasons (physiological, cognitive, psychosexual and psychosocial). The time is ripe in adolescence, and it must happen in adolescence or he will have missed his appointed task and epigenesis.

-- Delay and procrastination is a dangerous symptom.

One life cycle and one segment of history coincide to allow a unique creation of responsibility and personal unity. The epigenetic superego contributes directly to such inner coherence and ideological perspective. The task belongs essentially to the adolescent; but for the ever growing man open to his future, the call to personal unity in freedom as a singular man and as a man for others, is always there.

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